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TWO APPROACHES TO GUEST STATUTES IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS: MECHANICAL JURISPRUDENCE VERSUS
GROPING FOR CONTACTS
MARVn
I.

A.

G. BAER*

INTRODUCTION

The Problem Defined

N December 1966, John Motorist and Henry Passenger, both residents and
citizens of Massachusetts, having seen a brightly illustrated vive la difference
advertisement in the New Yorker, decided to make a trip to Quebec to see a live
"Separatist" and practice their highschool French. They traveled to New York
by bus where John Motorist rented a car for the trip. They stopped off in Buffalo
to pick up Miss Gratuitous Passenger, Henry's cousin, who is a resident and
citizen of New York. Just outside of Toronto they stopped and gave a ride to a
hitchhiker, a farm boy from Saskatchewan on his way to the big Eastern cities
for the first time. Near Prescott, Ontario, John Motorist, who was busily gawking at this near, friendly, familiar, but foreign countryside, missed a bend in the
road and the car plunged into a large ravine injuring all three passengers. John
Motorist and Henry Passenger were rushed to a hospital in Prescott where they
remained for two weeks. The Saskatchewan farm boy was sent to a hospital in
Alexandria Bay, New York, where after spending one night he was discharged.
Miss Gratuitous Passenger, after being examined on the scene by a physician,
was flown by helicopter to Montreal because of a serious head injury. She remained there for several months, and later spent several months in a Buffalo
hospital.1
All three passengers now wish to sue John Motorist. They learn that under
Ontario Law2 at the time of the accident, the driver of a motor vehicle was not
liable for injuries to gratuitous passengers caused by his negligence. Under New
York3 and Quebec Law4 there is no limitation to his liability, while under Massachusetts common law5 a motorist is liable to his guest only for gross negligence. Finally, in Saskatchewan 6 there must be a showing of wilful or wanton
misconduct.
* Professor of Law, Queen's Univ., Kingston, Ontario.
4. The example is intended only to be typical and to set the stage for the following discussion. It is not intended to be exhaustive.
2. The Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. ch. 172, @105(2) (1960), provides in part,
"the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of
carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from
bodily injury to, or death of any person being carried in . . . the motor vehicle." Section
20(2) of the Highway Traffic Amendment Act (1966) which changes the Ontario guest
statute to one of "gross negligence" applies only to accidents which occur after January 1,
1967. The new provision does not remove the conflict among Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan
and New York laws.
3. Cf. N.Y. Veh. &Traf. Law §§ 310(2), 316.
4. Cf. Quebec Civil Code § 1053.
5. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
6. Vehicles Act, Rev. Stat. Sask. eh. 377, § 168(2) (1965).
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They now wish to know whether their success depends on whether they sue
in New York or Quebec, rather than Ontario, Saskatchewan, or Massachusetts.
What difference should it make where they sue, they ask. If the courts recognize
that a law other than that of the forum may apply in these circumstances, would
they all choose the same law? Would they apply the same law to all three passengers?
The answers to these questions depend on what factors each court considers
significant. The court could apply the law of the place where the accident occurred in spite of the fact that the presence or absence of a guest statute does not
affect a driver's conduct. John Motorist was in fact ignorant of the Ontario law,
as were all of the passengers. Even if he had known the Ontario law, he would
have driven in the same manner. However, even though the place of accident may
be fortuitous, the application of its law may be justified on the ground that it is
readily ascertainable and leads to uniform results. But there are other "connecting factors" which are readily ascertainable and which in all cases lead to a single
law. These include the place where the car is garaged, licensed and insured, the
domicile of the defendant, the domicile of the insurance company and the place
where insurance was taken out. Since none of these factors are fortuitous, if the
only considerations are uniformity of result and ease of application, they may
have advantage over the place of the accident.
The court could apply the law of the plaintiff passenger's domicile on the
ground that it is the one he can foresee, and he can arrange his insurance accordingly. This would mean applying a different law for each passenger, and would
ignore the expectations of the nominal defendant, the driver. This may not be
desirable if, in fact, drivers rely on the guest statutes of their domicile and fail
to insure against liability for gratuitous passengers. If the court considers the
expectations of the parties, it could look to the law of the place where the car is
garaged, licensed, or insured as being the law which both parties can foresee, even
though, as here, it may have no other connection with the parties. This mutually
foreseeable law could also be that of the place where the "relationship" between
the parties was formed.
The court could ignore the nominal defendant and look to the insurance
company and its expectations. One could argue that insurance companies base
their rates on past experience and that in the modern computer age they can
calculate rates with any applicable law and, indeed, still calculate rates using
theories of probability, just as accurately as if the courts flipped a coin in each
case.
If the emphasis is shifted away from the parties expectations and the
uniformity of result among courts and plaintiffs, the court could nevertheless
apply a foreign law. The court could do this because it finds the purpose or policy
behind its rule cannot be accomplished by the application of the rule in the circumstances. Should it also consider the purpose and policy of the foreign conflicting rule? How does the court do this? Does it make its own determination
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of the purpose of the rule or simply look to see what the foreign court would do?
What if there is a conflict of purposes? Which one prevails? Will all purposes be
considered legitimate?
The court could look to the "interests" of foreign states. They would have to
decide whether they would determine for themselves what the "interests" were
and whether all interests would be recognized. Must there be some connection
with the state to support its interest? Would a connection such as domicile,
hospitalization, or accident within the state support the interest even though
not directly related to the interest? If hospitalization is recognized as a connecting factor sufficient to support an interest, should the passengers have been asked
where they wanted to be sent? Should recovery depend on such a fortuitous thing
as the location of the closest hospital or who is put in the first ambulance?
B.

The Purpose of the Paper

The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine the treatment by Canadian
courts 7 of guest statutes in the conflict of laws to see which of the above factors
they have considered significant, and to contrast this treatment with the approach
used by the New York courts since Babcock v. Jackson.8 An attempt will be
made to show what problems each approach creates and how they fail to provide
a usable, just solution in all circumstances. Finally, some presumptuous suggestions will be made as to what the courts should be doing in this area and
how they should do it.
This is not meant to suggest that guest statutes in themselves are, at least in
Canada, of great importance in the conflict of laws. In fact, the question is infrequently litigated in Canadian courts. Nor is it suggested that the solution to
this problem will have universal, or even widespread application. However, it is
the feeling of the writer that enough has been written by Canadian judges and
scholars about such broad categories as contracts, torts, and marriage in the conflict of laws to show that such generalizations frequently fail to provide adequate,
just solutions to specific problems.9 It is hoped that the present approach, the
individual treatment of specific issues, can be of meaningful assistance in many
other areas of conflict of laws.
However, because of the Candian courts' approach, it is impossible to discuss only guest statutes. Canadian courts still conceive of a relatively short list of
choice of law rules. Each rule applies to a broad legal category. When a dispute
arises and the facts point to conflicting laws, the laws are subsumed under a
legal category and by application of the choice of law rule that is attached to the
7. After some earlier doubts, it has been decided that Quebec courts, like those of the
other Canadian provinces, are bound by the rules laid down in the English cases. O'Connor
v. Wray [1930) Can. Sup. Ct. 231, [1930) 2 D.L.R. 899; Canadian Nat'l S.S. Co. v. Watson,
[1939) Can. Sup. Ct. 11, [19393 1 D.L.R. 273.
8. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
9. In spite of the fact that this argument has been frequently repeated since the pioneering works of Cook and Lorenzen, the advice has gone largely unheeded in Canada. For a
collection of the works of these authors see Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942), and Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws (1947).
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legal category, the problem is solved. 10 Hence, the conflicting laws that result
from the presence or absence of a guest statute are subsumed under the legal
category of torts. Given the nature of the Canadian courts' approach, it is
necessary to examine the choice of law rule that is usually attached to torts and
then examine its application to situations involving guest statutes.
As we shall see, this line of reasoning has not been completely discarded in
New York. While there is movement towards more numerous legal categories
and more rules and an increasing awareness of the individuality of problems, there
is still a search for one rule to apply in tort conflicts cases. On its face, Babcock
purports to outline a new single, flexible rule applicable in all cases involving
the conflict of tort laws.

II.
A.

THE CANADIAN RULE

The General Rule

Traditionally then, Canada has been said to have one choice of law rule
governing torts, and it is usually explained in terms of the triad of Phillips v.
Eyre," Machado v. Fontes,12 and McLean v. Pettigrew.lu
In Phillips an action for damages for false imprisonment was brought in
England against a former governor of Jamaica. The imprisonment occurred during a rebellion and an act of the Jamaican legislature had since been passed in
which the governor's acts were "hereby made and declared to be lawful, and are
confirmed." 14
In dismissing the action, Willis, J., said:
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong
alleged to have been committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled.
First, the wrong must be of such a character that it would have been
actionable if committed in England. . . .Secondly, the act must not
have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done. 15
The first branch of this rule is based on the Judicial Committee decision
in The Halley.16 There the court dismissed a suit in admiralty founded upon a
liability under Belgian law for a collision caused by a pilot whom the shipowner
was compelled by that law to employ. Under English law, the pilot not being
the shipowner's agent, the shipowner was not responsible. In allowing the shipowner's appeal, the Judicial Committee concluded,
it is, in their Lordships' opinion, alike contrary to principle and to
authority to hold, that an English Court of Justice will enforce a
10. This is the gist of what happens. For a complete explanation see Falconbridge, Conflict Ride and Characterizationof Question, 30 Can. B. Rev. 103 (1952); Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940) ; Lederman, Classification in P.I.L., 29 Can. B.
Rev. 3-33, 168-184 (1951).
11. L.R. 4 Q.B. 225, 38 L.J.Q.B. 113 (1869) ; aff'd, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 40 L.J.Q.B. 28 (1870).
12. [18971 2 Q.B. 231, 66 L.J.Q.B. 542 (CA.).
13. [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [1945) 2 D.L.R. 65.
14. Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 4 Q.B. 225, 227, 38 L.J.Q.B. 113, 121 (1869).
15. L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, at 28-29 (1870).

16. L.R. 2 P.C. 193 (1870).
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Foreign Municipal law, and will give a remedy in the shape of damages
in respect of an act which, according to its own principles, imposes no
liability on the person from whom the damages are claimed.' 7
The Halley could have been interpreted and thereby limited in one of three
ways. It could be confined to attempts to establish vicarious liability under a
foreign law. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as an example of public policy
considerations. Or finally, it could be an example of an early American doctrine
that causes of action will not be entertained when too dissimilar to causes of
action under domestic law. 18 However, since Phillips incorporated the rule it has
not been so limited. In Canada even forum technical defences have resulted in the
action being dismissed.' 9
Machado v. Fontes2 ° holds that to be "justifiable" under the second branch
of the test means absence of a civil and criminal liability. In this case an action
was based on a libel published in Brazil where it was not civilly actionable but
subjected the libelant to criminal prosecution. The English Court of Appeal allowed the action, noting that the change of wording from "actionable" to "justifiable" in the two branches of the rule was deliberate and that "in order to
constitute a good defence to an action brought in this country in respect of an
act done in a foreign country, the act relied on must be one which is innocent in
21
the country where it was committed."1
This definition of justifiable has been accepted in a long line of Canadian
cases. 2 Foreign technical defences have been given effect also2 Even though
there may have been a possibility to collect compensation under a workmen's
compensation act 24 or sue an employer before an administrative board2 5 in the
foreign state, acts have been held justifiable. In the leading guest statute case it
was held that to be justifiable the act must be neither civilly actionable, criminal
nor a provincial offence.2 6
17. Id. at 204.
18 Cf. Slater v Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
19. Simonson v. Canadian No. Ry., 24 Man. 267, 28 West. L.R. 310 (CA. 1914).
20. [1897) 2 Q.B. 231, 66 L.J.Q.B. 542 (CA.)
21. Id. at 233, 66 L.J.Q.B. at 543 (Emphasis added.).
22. Canadian Nat'l S.S. Co. v. Watson, [1939] Can. Sup. Ct. 11, [1939] 1 D.L.R. 273;
Young v. Industrial Chem. Co., [1939] 4 D.L.R. 392, [1939] 2 West. Weekly R.
468, 54 B.C. 309; O'Connor v. Wray, [1930] Can. Sup. Ct. 231, [1930] 2 D.L.R. 899; Simonson v. Canadian No. Ry., 24 Man. 267, 6 West. Weekly R. 898, 17 D.L.R. 516 (CA. 1914);
C.P.R. v. Parent, [1917] A.C. 195, 33 D.L.R. 12, 20 Can. Ry. Cas. 141; McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65; Gills Supply Co. v. Chicago M. & P.S. Ry.,
16 B.C. 254, 18 West. L.R. 355, 13 Can. Ry. Cas. 35 (CA. 1911); McCarthy v. Kenny,
[,1939] 3 D.L.R. 556 (Ont.); McLeod v. Paul, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 718, [1938] 3 West. Weekly
R. 466 (Man. CA.); Brown v. Poland & Emerson Motors Ltd., 6 West. Weekly R. (n.s.)
368 (Alta. 1952); Williams v. Tang &Mitchell, [1933] 2 West. Weekly R. 113, 47 B.C. 81.
23. Ward v. British Am. Oil Co., 16 Sask. 526 [1923] 1 West. Weekly R. 1240; Couture
v. Dominion Fish Co., 19 Man. 65, 11 West. L.R. 412 (CA. 1909); Johnson v. Canadian
No. Ry., 19 Man. 179, 12 West. L.R. 124 (CA. 1909); Young v. Industrial Chem. Co.,
supra note 22.

24. Walpole v. Canadian No. Ry., [1923] A.C. 113, 92 LJ.C.P. 39, 128 L.T.R. (n.s)

289, 70
25.
293, 70
26.

D.L.R. 201.
McMillan v. Canadian No. Ry., [1923] A.C. 120, 92 L.J.C.P. 44, '128 L.T.R. (ns.)
D.L.R. 229.
McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65.
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The resulting rule seems to be that a Canadian court will apply forum law,
with the exception of cases where the act is neither civilly actionable, criminal,
nor a provincial offence "by the law of the place where it was done." It is important to state the rule in this way. It is not true that the court applies forum law
subject to some defences under the law of the place where the act was done.
There may be a good defence to a civil action by the law of the place where the
act was done, yet if it is also criminal under that law, it is not "justifiable" and
forum law will apply.
B.

An Example of the Nature of Conflicts Development in Canada

The rigid application of this rule by the courts has had a profound effect
on the nature of academic discussion of conflict of tort laws theory in Canada.
Effort has been directed toward finding escape hatches to avoid the rigorous
application of the rule. For example, it has been argued by Mr. Donald Spence0 7
that Phillips v. Eyre28 only establishes a jurisdictional rule. Since the action was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, a choice of law rule was unnecessary. Mr.
Spence, following the attitude of the courts, supports his thesis from the wording
of the judgment. In the paragraph before the one in which he announced his
famous two-fold test, Willis, J., says,
the civil liability arising out of a wrong derives its birth from the law
of the place, and its character is determined by that law. Therefore,
an act committed abroad, if valid and unquestionable by the law of the
place, cannot, so far as civil liability is concerned, be drawn in question
elsewhere unless by force of some distinct exceptional legislation,
superadding a liability other than and besides that incident to the act
itself.2 9
This, Mr. Spence argues, shows that Mr. Justice Willis recognized the general
choice of law rule of lex loci delicti in torts and the sentence immediately before
the two-fold test shows that in that paragraph he had switched his consideration
from choice of law to jurisdiction:
Our courts are said to be more open to admit actions founded upon
foreign transaction than those of any other European country; but
there are restrictions in respect of locality which exclude some foreign
causes of actions altogether, namely, those which would be local if they
arose in England, such as trespass to land: Doulson v. Matthews
[ (1792) 4 T.R. 503], and even with respect to those not falling within
that description our courts do not undertake universal jurisdiction. 30
The case of Machado v. Fontes3 l is not inconsistent with this theory. There
both Lopes, L.J., and Rigby, L.J., hold that once it is established that the act
27. Spence, Conflict of Laws in Automobile Negligence Cases, 27 Can. B. Rev. 661
(1949). See also Yntema, Book Review, 27 Can. B. Rev. 116, 117-22 (1949).
28. L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 40 L.J.Q.B. 28 (1870).
29. Id. at 28, 40 L.J.Q.B. at 40.

30. Ibid.

31. [18971 2 QB. 231,66 LJ.Q.B. S42 (CA.).
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in question is actionable in England, there remains only a question of damages
or remedy, which is governed by the law of the forum.
Lopes, L.J. says,
It then follows, directly the right of action is established in this country,
that the ordinary incidents of that action and the appropriate remedies
ensue. Therefore, in this case, in my opinion, damages would flow from
any action brought in rethe wrong committed just as they would in
32
spect of a libel published in this country.
Rigby, L.J. concludes his opinion,
We start, then, from this: that the act in question is prima facie actionable here, and the only thing we have to do is to see whether there is
any peremptory bar to our jurisdiction arising from the fact that the
act we are dealing with is authorized, or innocent or excusable, in
the country where it was committed. If we cannot see that, we must act
according to our own rules in the damages (if any) which we may
choose to give.3
These opinions are in line with the then prevailing treatment of tort law
as a branch of the law of remediesA
Spence's theory has been accepted by Cheshire3 5 and Castel.3 6 However,
this controversy may be academic in Canada because of the leading Canadian
case of McLean v. Pettigrew.37 Since it is the only case of the three which concerns a guest statute it merits examination in detail. Action was brought in
Quebec for damages for injury suffered by the plaintiff in an accident which
occurred in Ontario by reason of the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff
being a gratuitous passenger in the defendant's motor car. The Ontario Highway
Traffic Act included a provision that "the owner or driver of a motor vehicle,
other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or
the death of any person being carried in or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or
alighting from the motor vehicle." 38
There was no such provision in the law of Quebec. The Supreme Court of
Canada sustained a judgment for the plaintiff. In doing so they must have applied
Quebec law-at least they ignored the Ontario guest statute. However, the court
shed little light on what it was doing. Phillips v. Eyre39 was nowhere referred to
32. Id. at 234, 66 L.J.Q.B. at 543.
33. Id. at 235-36, 66 L.J.Q.B. at 544.
34. Smith, Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Modern L. Rev. 447 (1957) ; Ehrenzweig,
The Place of Acting in International Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36
Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1951).
35. Cheshire, Private International Law 290 (6th ed. 1961).
36. Castel, Private International Law 223-24 (1960). The argument that Phillips v.
Eyre only establishes a jurisdictional rule or a "threshold" requirement finds its latest expression in Gerber, Tort Liability in the Conflict of Laws, 40 Austl. L.J. 44, 73 (1966).
37. [19451 Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [19451 2 D.L.R. 65.
38. Rev. Stat. Ont. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
39. L.R. 6Q.B. 1,40 L.J.Q.B. 28 (1870).
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in the case, but Dicey's rule based on Phillips was. Machado v. Montes4 o was
only referred to in a list of tort conflict cases.
Mr. Justice Tashereau, after concluding the act was "wrongful," i.e., nonjustifiable in Ontario because it violated a provincial statute,4 1 ended his judgment thus:
It follows that the respondent has established two of the conditions
necessary to involve the responsibility of the appellant. The act with
which she charges him is a quasi-delict for which damages could be
obtained in the Province of Quebec, if it had been committed in that
Province. She has also shown that it is "wrongful" in Ontario because it
is a violation of a provincial statute. The appellant 42cannot be exonerated and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
From this it is unclear whether Mr. Justice Tashereau applied Quebec law
because, as Machado and early Canadian authorities43 have held, it was a matter
of remedies governed by the law of the forum, or because the two-fold test of
Phillips, adpoted by way of Dicey, laid down a choice of law rule. He also overruled a long line of Canadian authority which looked to the lex loci delicti to
govern torts conflicts without mentioning one of these cases. 44 In fact in most
early Canadian cases the courts, no doubt under American influence, spoke of
rights vesting at the place where the tort occurred. For example in Johnson v.
CanadianNo. Ry.,45 Mr. Justice Perdue of the Manitoba Court of Appeal said,
"the injury took place in Ontario and it is clear that the Manitoba Act cannot
apply," 46 and later, "if she [plaintiff] has not the legal capacity to sue in Ontario
for a wrong which took place there, she cannot sue in Manitoba," 47 and, "a
Manitoba Court must in dealing with this action, apply the Ontario statute which
4
48
gave the right to recover compensation." In Couture v.Dominion Fish Co. 9
the same judge said in regard to a suit brought in Manitoba for a death in the
North West Territories, "it is plain that in dealing with the matters in question
the Court should proceed as if it were a court of justice for the North West
Territories, applying the law in force in those Territories but making use of its
own procedure and practice." 50
Even in the Canadian Supreme Court the lex loci delicti rule was recognized.
40.
41.

[1897] 2 Q.B. 231, 66 L.J.Q.B. 542 (C.A.).
Le., driving without due care and attention. The Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat.

Ont. ch. 172, § 27 (1960).

42. [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, 79, [1945) 2 D.L.R. 65, 80.
43. E.g., Story v. Standford Mill Bldg. Co., 30 Ont. L.R. 271 (C.A. 1913).
44. Lewis v. Grand Trunk Pac. Ry., 52 Can. Sup. Ct. 227, 26 D.L.R. 687, 20 Can. Ry.
Cas. 318, 9 West. Weekly R. 1541; Papageorgiouv v. Turner, 37 N.B. 449, (CA. 1906); Johnson v. Canadian No. Ry., 19 Man. 179, 12 West. L.R. 124 (C.A. 1909); Caldwell v. Reilly
& Bell, [1932) 3 D.L.R. 149, [1932] 1 West. Weekly R. 890, 45 B.C. 342.
45. 19 Man. 179, 12 West. L.R. 124 (C.A. 1909).
46. Id. at 184, 12 West. L.R. at 126.
47. Id. at 185, 12 West. L.R. at 126.
48. Id. at 186, 12 West. L.R. at 127.
49. 19 Man. 65, 12 West. L.R. 412 (1909).
50. Id. at 80, 12 West. L.R. at 418-19.
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In OttawaElec. Ry. v. Letang,5 ' action was brought in Quebec, the accident having occurred in Ontario. In applying Ontario law the court held, "although the
action was brought in Quebec, it is of course clear-indeed it is common groundthat these questions must be answered according to the law of Ontario where the
52
accident happened."
That this vested rights approach was thought to be consistent with Phillips
v. Eyre5 3 is shown by the statement in Lewis v. Grand Trunk Pac. Ry. by Mr.
Justice Brodeur in the Supreme Court of Canada: "The accident having occurred
in the Province of Ontario was necessarily to be decided according to the laws of
that province. 'Lex loci actus' must furnish the rule to dispose of the case, as
Cockburn, CJ. decided in Phillips v. Eyre....
"
One may ask what difference it makes if it is called a choice of law rule or
jurisdiction rule if the court invariably dismisses an action when the two-fold
test is not met and invariably applies forum law when it is. Such a question
indicates that the discussion is largely a tempest in a tea pot. It has been examined
here to show that the conflict of tort laws rule has been settled only recently, if at
all, in Canada, and to show that there would have been historical justification for
55
an alternative solution. Also, since McLean v. Pettigrew
is typical of the lack
of choice of law discussion in the cases, it may even now be argued that the way
is still open for the Canadian Supreme Court to confine Phillips to the jurisdictional question and develop an independent choice of law rule. Admittedly this
would bring a significant change only where the conduct was not civilly actionable
but was criminal or a provincial offence where committed. However, this is often
the case in automobile accident cases. For example, in all the guest statute
provinces there is a provincial offence of driving without due care and attention.
More importantly, the discussion is presented to illustrate the attitude of the
court and academic reaction to it. The courts have given Phillipsa technical and
strict interpretation, carefully distinguishing between the two branches of the
rule. The reaction of this is to outwit the courts at their own game by just as
careful an examination of words. The hope, of course, is to present a way to avoid
a rigorous application of Phillips.
C. Application of the Rule to Guest Statutes
In turning from general torts conflict theory to the particular question of
what Canadian courts do with foreign guests statutes, one is immediately struck
by the scarcity of cases. This scarcity of litigation seems unusual in view of the
difference among the provincial statutes and the fact that Quebec has no guest
51. [1924] Can. Sup. Ct. 470, [19241 4 D.L.R. 89, 32 Can. Ry. Cas. 142. See also
Duff, J., in Livesley v. Horst Co., [1924] Can. Sup. Ct. 605, [1925] 1 D.L.R. 159.
52. [1924] Can. Sup. Ct. 470, 475, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 89, 92 (opinion per Anglin, J.).
53. L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 40 LJ.Q.B. 28 (1870).
54. [1915] 52 Can. Sup. Ct. 227, 241 (dissenting opinion). Note Mr. justice Brodeur
refers to the opinion of the lower court and not to the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber.
55. [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [1945] 2 D.L... 65.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
statute provision at all. In British Columbia 6 and the Yukon Territories57 no
action lies unless the owner or driver was grossly negligent. In Alberta, 8
Manitoba 5 9 Newfoundland,60 Prince Edward Island,(" Nova Scotia, 2 and New
Brunswick 3 the statutes are practically identical and motorists are liable to
gratuitous passengers in cases of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct. While in Ontario 4 there must now be a showing of gross negligence, in
the North West Territories 65 there is still a complete denial of liability to gratuitous passengers. And finally, in Saskatchewan, 0 the owner or driver is not liable
unless there was wilful and wanton misconduct. There are as many international
conflicts cases 67 as interprovincial cases0 8 and so far no Canadian court has distinguished between the two. Indeed given the absence of a full faith and credit
clause in the Canadian Constitution, the mobility of motorists throughout Canada
and the United States, and the general similarity of political institutions, legal
thinking and manner of living, such a distinction, in this area at least, seems
artificial and undesirable. In all the guest statute cases, no matter how the conflict arouse, i.e., whether the statute was part of the law of the forum and not
the place of the accident or vice versa or whether either or both of the parties were
domiciled in either state, the approach has been the same. The court applies the
general test of Phillips v. Eyre.69
Using the present rule, there is no uniformity of result among various courts.
Each province applies its own guest statute or ignores foreign ones. The result
depends upon where suit is brought. The forum law will be applied whether or not
there is any real connection with the forum other than the fact that the action
was commenced there. The expectations of the parties are ignored and forum law
is applied whether or not the purpose of the forum law is enhanced thereby
and whether or not the state has any interest in applying its own law. 70
In the discussion of the leading case, McLean v. Pettigrew,7 1 it was mentioned that the gratuitous passenger was allowed to sue his driver in Quebec for
injuries received in Ontario, the court not applying the Ontario guest statute.
While there was certainly no policy discussion and no attempt to analyze the
56. Motor Vehicle Act, Rev. Stat. B.C. ch. 253, § 71 (1960).
57. Motor Vehicles Ordinance, Rev. Ord. Yukon Terr. ch. 77, § 137(1) (1953).
58. Vehicles and Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat. Alberta ch. 356, § 132 (1955).
59. Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat. Man. ch. 112, § 99 (1954).
60. Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat. Newfoundland ch. 94, § 80(1) (1952).
61. Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat. Prince Edward Island ch. 73, § 70(1) (1951).
62. Motor Vehicle Act, Rev. Stat. N.S. ch. 184, § 203(1) (1954).
63. Motor Vehicle Act, N.B. Stat. ch. 13, § 242 (1955).
64. Highway Traffic Amendment Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. ch. 64, § 20(2) (1966).
65. Motor Vehicles Ordinance, Rev. Ord. Nw. Terr. ch. 72, § 90(3) (1956).
66. Vehicles Act, Rev. Stat. Sask. ch. 377, § 168(2) (1965).
67. Williams v. Tang & Mitchell, [19333 2 West. Weekly R. 113, 47 B.C. 81; McLeod
v. Paul, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 718, [1938) 3 West. Weekly R. 466 (Man. CA.); Morris v. Stutback, 5 D.L.R. 2d 30, (B.C. 1956).
68. McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65; Lieff v.
Palmer, 63 Que. K.B. 278 (1937); Howells v. Wilson, 69 Que. K.B. 32 (1940).
69. L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 40 L.J.Q.B. 28 (1870).
70. Whatever the terms "expectation," "purpose" and "interest" may mean.
71. [1945] Can. Sup. Ct. 62, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65.
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justice or desirability of the rule in its application to this particular problem,
"the result can hardly be called unjust in the particular circumstances, because
the domestic law of Quebec was applied to a controversy between two persons,
domiciled in Quebec who were only temporarily present in Ontario, and the result
probably accorded with the expectations of the parties, so far as they had any
expectations." 7 2
Perhaps the real test will come when the "particular circumstances" are not
so neat, when the forum has no connection with the parties or the accident, or
when the only connection is that the accident happened within the province or one
of the parties was domiciled there. However, there is nothing in the Supreme
Court opinion which would indicate a departure from Phillips in such circumstances. In fact there is nothing to indicate the courts awareness of the possible
desirability of an alternative solution. It is hard to disagree with Hancock when
he characterizes the approach of McLean as a "striking example of mechanical
jurisprudence-blind adherence to a verbal formula without any regard for
policies or consequences."' a
At least the Quebec Queen's Bench has recognized that the traditional
formula may prove unworkable in some circumstances. In Lieff v. Palmer74 an
action was brought in Quebec by the plaintiff, an Ontario domiciliary, for damages sustained as a gratuitous passenger in Ontario, against the defendant and
her husband who were also domiciled in Ontario. The court disposed of the
appeal by finding no proof which would justify a conviction of respondents in
Ontario under the criminal law or the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, or that
respondents' action would give rise to a "condemnation" in Ontario. This saved
the court from having to decide whether Quebec law would apply to an action
brought in Quebec when its only connection with the case was the fact that suit
was brought there, Mr. Justice Barclay states, "whether or not that doctrine
[Machado v. Fontes] could be applied as between two provinces in the same
country is very much open to question." 7 5 McLean later holds that the doctrine
is to be applied as between two provinces in Canada and completely ignores the
strange result of this type of situation.
The way seems open for Ontario domiciliaries to ignore the Ontario statute
and bring suit in Quebec (assuming jurisdiction can be established there). All
they would have to show is the violation of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, a
simple task if they can show negligence to make defendant liable in the first
place. With this judgment in hand they can return to Ontario and sue on it- 6
The fact that it has been held that this does not allow them to sue the insur72. Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict of Laws 831 (2d ed. 1954).
73. Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 89 (1942). Hancock was referring to an
earlier Canadian case, Simonson v. Canadian No. Ry., 24 Man. 267, 28 West L.R. 310

(CA. 1914).
74. 63 Que. K.B. 278 (1937).
75. Id. at 290.
76. Ontario Judicature Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. ch. -197, J 51 (1960).
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ance company or the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund directly 77 means that the
Quebec judgment is not as effective as an Ontario judgment, but it is one means
of by-passing the guest statute.
The mention of insurance introduces an element that so far has been completely ignored by the Canadian courts. To examine the problem of guest statutes
realistically it must be remembered that they are designed to protect insurance
companies. In a litigation between a gratuitous passenger and the owner or driver
of a motor vehicle the real disputants are the injured plaintiff and an insurance
company. This fact of life will have to be kept clearly in mind in formulating new
approaches and in judging the desirability of existing ones.
III.

THE NEW YoRK RULE(s)

A.

The Rule Replaced

Like their Canadian counterparts, American courts, at least until recent
years, have considered that every tort was "governed" by one law. Once the
cause of action before the court was characterized as one in tort, it only remained
to apply the single choice of law rule which applied to all torts to arrive at a
single governing law. However, the single choice of law rule commonly used was
not that of the British Commonwealth.
The rule, widely adopted in American jurisdictions, which "in recent years
courts and writers have treated as axiomatic,"7T is that torts are governed by the
"law of the place of wrong." The best known formulation of the rule is that of
the American Law Institute Restatement:
Section 384. (1) If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of
wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states.
(2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no
recovery in tort can be had in any other state.
Section 377. The place of wrong is in the state where the last 0event
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.
The long debate over the definition of the "place of wrong" as the place of
conduct or place of harm is outside the scope of this paper.80 No attempt will be
made to determine whether this formulation accurately describes what the courts
have done or are doing in all tort cases. It is sufficient to note here that they
purport to be applying this single, all-encompassing rule and, unlike its Canadian
77. Monast v. Provincial Ins. Co. of England, [1939) 4 D.L.R. 814, [1939] Ont. Weekly
N. 113. In this case the plaintiff obtained a New York judgment and sued on the judgment
in Ontario. She obtained a judgment in Ontario on the specially endorsed writ by default.
She then sued the insurance company under J 223(1) of the Insurance Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. ch.
190 (1960). The plaintiff's suit was dismissed, inter alia, because her claim against the company was founded on an Ontario judgment against the insured not for damages, but for
debt. Quaere, whether the same result would follow if she had simply filed the foreign judgment under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. ch. 345 (1960),
and then sued the insurance company.
78. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 541 (1962).
79. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 384 (1934).
80. See Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 78, at 543.
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equivalent, it has been mentioned and applied by enough courts to clearly
establish it as a choice of law rule.
In the particular area of guest statutes Professor Ehrenzweig has noted,
"notwithstanding the obvious inadequacy of the place-of-wrong rule in the application of guest statutes, the courts' language in the seventy-odd conflicts cases
which have invoked such statutes points to a virtually unanimous adoption of
8
the rule." '
Dr. Castel has described the American approach as "more logical" and from
the point of view of justice, "superior" although conceding that "the lex loci
delicti is not the only connecting factor which deserves consideration in all foreign
tort cases." 82 It is true that the American rule has one advantage over the Canadian rule. That is, the result of the lawsuit does not depend on the forum in
which it is brought. Assuming the place of wrong is defined in the same way in
all jurisdictions, all courts will look to the same single law to determine whether
a gratuitous passenger can sue the driver or owner. However, it is difficult to see
its superiority from the point of view of justice when the place of wrong is completely fortuitous. Why should a question that essentially has nothing to do with
conduct be determined by the lex loci delicti?
B.

3
Babcock v. Jackson8

In 1963 the New York Court of Appeals recognized that the Restatement
"place of wrong" rule was not the answer in all conflict of tort laws cases. It
had long been recognized by academic writers that the fortuitous place of accident, without more, seemed particularly inappropriate in guest statute cases. In
Babcock the Court was presented with an extreme and therefore easily solvable
case. The owner-driver of the automobile and his guest were residents of New
York. They set out from New York for a weekend trip to Ontario; while there an
accident occurred in which the plaintiff guest was injured. Suit was brought in
New York and defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
Ontario Highway Traffic Act" barred all suits by gratuitous passengers against
owners or drivers. There was no similar provision in New York law.
The Court pointed out that the law of the place of wrong had its conceptual
foundation in the vested rights doctrine which "has long since been discredited
because it fails to take account of underlying policy considerations in evaluating
the influence to be ascribed to the circumstance that an act had a foreign situs
81.

Id. at 578. See also Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale

L.J. 595 (1960).

82.

Castel, op. cit. supra note 36, at 230.

83.

12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). There was some fore-

shadowing of Babcock v. Jackson. There had been much chafing under the traditional rule,
and it had been avoided by some questionable interpretation and characterization. See such
cases as Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Mass.), affd sub nom. Parker v. Gordon, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) ;
Sdhmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
84. Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
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in determining the right and liabilities which arise out of that act."8 5 The Court
noted that "the mechanical formula of the conflicts of law" had been abandoned
in contract cases 6 and decided:
The "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine adopted
by this court in conflicts cases involving contracts impresses us as likewise affording the appropriate approach for accommodating the competing interests in tort cases with multi-state contacts. Justice, fairness, and "the best practical result" (Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
280 N.Y. 135...) may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to
the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact
the greatest concern with the
with the occurrence or the parties 8has
7
specific issue raised in the litigation
The Court says this is the position taken by the Restatement, Conflict of
Laws (Second) with its reference to "the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort." 8
Applying this new rule the Court holds that, "Comparison of the relative
'contacts' and 'interests' of New York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-a-vis
the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best
minimal ... ."89
Why did the Court reach this conclusion? The Court examined the object of
the Ontario statute and found it was designed to prevent the fraudulent assertions of claims by passengers, in collusion with drivers, against insurance companies and "quite obviously the fraudulent claims intended to be prevented by
the statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and their insurance
carriers." 90 At this point it seems that the court in interpreting the Ontario
statute finds it does not apply to nonresidents. However, from other parts of the
opinion it seems clear that the result would be the same even if the statute by
express language applied to nonresidents. The Court says "Ontario has no conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against his New York
host for injuries suffered in Ontario. .. 2'91
It is obvious from the material cited above that the new rule enunciated by
the court is anything but clear. Terms such as "center of gravity," "grouping of
contacts," "most significant relationship," "contacts" and "interests" are bandied
about with great enthusiasm. As well, the Court paused long enough to throw a
bone at one potential critic by adding, "Indeed, such a result, we note, accords
with 'the interests of the host in procuring liability insurance adequate under
85. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1963).
86. See, e.g., Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
87. 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283,240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
88. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 379(1) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) ; see
also Introductory Note to Topic 1 of ch. 9, id. at 3.
89. 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
90. Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. The court relies on Comment,
Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. Toronto LJ. 358, 366 (1936).
91. Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (Emphasis added.).
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the applicable law and the interests of his insurer in reasonable calculability of
the premium.' ,*2
The Court does not seem conscious of the fact that the tags "interest,"
"contact," and "significant relationship" may have several denotations. It is
hardly surprising that in a symposium following the opinion several learned
authors found support for their pet theories.?3 Perhaps the Court was premeditatively vague or was announcing alternative tests, any of which would lead to the
same result.
There are several possible explanations of what the Court had in mind. But
first, a possible explanation which the Court probably did not contemplate should
be dismissed. The new test does not simply involve compiling two lists of contacts with each of two possible states and selecting the law of the state which
has the longest list of contacts. That this is an obvious danger with this type of
approach is well known, and it is a danger that busy courts will have to guard
against.
A more likely explanation, however, and one which seems similar to the
suggested solution of the Restatement (Second) is that there should be a counting of weighted contacts. This explanation realizes that some contacts are more
"significant" than others. The court unconsciously would deal with an imaginary
unit, perhaps a Sig, with the domicile of plaintiff being one Sig, the place of
accident being five Sigs and so on. Then the court, realizing that quality is more
important than quantity, would not just count contacts, but would count Sigs.
We, of course, have not discovered how many Sigs are in each "contact," but the
Restatement (Second) has attempted to start us on our way.94 We learn there
are more Sigs in the contact "place of accident" than in the contact "domicile of
plaintiff." It seems also that the process is made easier since once a table of
Sigs is decided upon, it can be applied to any issue arising in conflict of tort laws.
It would be comforting to think that this second explanation is not to be
taken too seriously. Unfortunately, as we shall see, something of this nature
appears to be happening in New York with a new contact "place where relationship formed" being assigned 1000 Sigs.
In Babcock v. Jackson9 5 itself, as has been pointed out above, it appears at
one point as if the Court is simply interpreting both laws in light of their objectives and deciding there is no conflict. If this is what in fact has happened then
no new choice of law rule was called for and the catchwords are dicta or window
dressing. But even confined to "interpretation" the case marks a break with
traditional methods of interpretation of possibly conflicting laws. Too often in
the past courts have just looked at the domestic laws to see what law applied to
a case without foreign elements, choosing between one of several laws applicable
92. Id. at 483-84, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (citing Ehrenzweig, Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale LJ. 595, 603 (1960)).
93. Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, Reese, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1963).
94. Restatement (Second), supra note 88, § 379(2).
95. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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to wholly domestic situations. Either the domestic law of the forum was applied
or, through an appropriate choice of law rule, the domestic law of another state.
Even in those cases where the courts invoked renvoi, eventually the same law
as one applied to a case without foreign elements was applied.
In Babcock the Court did not simply choose between the guest statute
provision of Ontario law and the no-guest-statute rule of New York law. Instead
it found, upon examining and interpreting the Ontario provision, that it did not
apply to this fact situation. Why not? Because "quite obviously the fraudulent
claims intended to be prevented by the statute are those asserted against Ontario
defendants and their insurance carriers." 96 Where a foreign defendant and his
insurance carrier are involved the statutory provision "quite obviously" does not
apply. That is, a different rule applies when a foreign element is involved. Do we
begin to smell the odour of "conceptualist decay"? 97 Here a New York court is
looking at Ontario law in a situation with a foreign element. The law applicable to
a situation involving foreign elements suggests the forces of choice of law at
work.
Can it be that behind this bright and promising new approach there hides a
"hornet's nest"? 98 At the risk of helping to confuse another generation of students the dreaded word must be spoken: renvoil 99 Since renvoi has been exiled
from the modern world of conflicts as "another miscreant of a conceptualism
gone rampant,"'100 you shall hear no more. From now on we shall discuss this
new approach to conflicts resolution as an intelligent interpretation in light of a
law's objectives. If this, in its application, somehow reminds you of something,
put it out of your mind.
This advice is not just given with tongue in cheek. Usually renvoi is used
when the forum wants to act as a foreign court or apply its whole law. Applying
renvoi in this sense to the facts of Babcock in view of what has been said of
Canadian conflict of laws would lead to the application of the Ontario guest
statute. What is suggested in Babcock then is not strictly renvoi, but imaginary
renvoi. The Court applies what it wishes were the foreign whole law-it fashions,
if you will, what it considers to be an ideal foreign law given the foreign law's
objectives. Using this technique the Court has no trouble in deciding the Ontario
Act should not apply. However if the Court is implying, as it reads the Ontario
law, that the act does not apply, it is indulging in a legal fiction in the nature of
John Doe and Richard Roe. One should clearly recognize that a new Ontario law
is being fashioned by the New York Court.
This of itself does not make the New York Court's method objectionable.
In fact it may be highly desirable to bow to foreign law only when it is designed
and does in fact carry into effect some policy objective. Why frustrate the forum's
96. Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
97. Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supranote 78, at 335.
98. Mason v. Rose, 176 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J., concurring).
99. Epithets such as "heretic," "purile," "paradoxical" and "burlesque," used to describe
this process, have been collected by Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 78, at 334.
100. Id. at 340.
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policy objective when the foreign rule sought to be applied advances no state's
objectives? However, the danger of this approach, as we shall see, is the capricious
verbalization of objectives and the Court's assumption that this verbalization is
an automatic process.
The New York Court did not have an opportunity to decide what to do if,
after fashioning this new "quite obvious" ideal Ontario law, it was found to
conflict with New York law. Under this interpretation analysis the court simply
side-stepped the problem of designing a new choice of law rule and pushed the
application of such a rule back one more step.
An alternative approach is suggested by the tags "interest" and "contact"
and the phrase "Ontario has no conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a
New York guest against his New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario. . . ."101 It may be the Court did want to and succeeded in devising a new
choice of law rule. This rule is that the law applied is that of the place which,
"because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the
102
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation."
It should be noted that interest alone is not enough. If the LieutenantGovernor of Ontario wrote to the New York Court saying that, because the
driver was a public hero, Ontario was extremely interested and had the greatest
concern, the Court would not therefore apply Ontario law. This suggestion may
be termed a red herring, because it is understood that the interest under consideration is not an interest in the particular litigants but interest in seeing a
particular policy implemented.' 03 However, even this interest alone is not enough.
There must be some "relationship" or "contact" upon which this interest can
ride. It must be "because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the
parties" °4 that it has the greatest concern.
In its negative application it is not too difficult to understand this requirement. For example, in Babcock the interest of Ontario was said to be in seeing
that Ontario insurance companies were protected against fraudulent claims.
Therefore, the contact, an Ontario insurance company, is necessary. Without this
contact Ontario is said to have no interest. The way the interest is phrased determines what contacts are necessary to support the interest. In this case the interest
could have been described as an interest in protecting all insurance companies
(as do the Ontario courts in their interpretation and application of the Ontario
rule). The fact that the Court phrased it the way it did shows how difficult it is
to get away from the legislative jurisdiction concept of the vested rights theory.
While the Court says here that "Ontario has no conceivable interest," what
101. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,
750 (1963) (Emphasis added.).
102. Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283,240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
103. There is a semantic problem here. It could be said either that a state has but one
interest (i.e., an interest in seeing its policies implemented) or various interests (i.e., separate
interest in seeing each individual policy implemented).
104. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,

749 (1963).
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it means is that Ontario has no interest that the court will recognize. The New
York Court does not examine too closely what Ontario or its courts think its
interest is. They do not write to the Ontario government, have the Ontario Attorney-General as an expert witness .or even examine what Ontario courts have
found Ontario's interest to be. Instead they fashion an ideal of what they think
Ontario's interest should be. The words "quite obviously" immediately warn that
in fashioning this interest, there are unexpressed self-evident truths lurking in
the Court's subconscious. There is an unarticulated basic axiom or commandment
such as "States, thou shalt not have an interest in protecting non-residents."
At this point it may be asked what the difference is between talking about
an imaginary Ontario interest or an imagined object of Ontario law. If the
interest is always in implementing a particular policy objective the two approaches coalesce. In the same way that by using the object analysis it can be
said that the Court did not have to resolve a conflict between objectives, by
using the interest analysis it can be suggested that the Court was not faced with
conflicting recognizable interests. It appears the Court said that the Ontario law's
object, as we see it, or Ontario's interest, which we shall accept, does not require
the application of Ontario's guest statute to these facts. Therefore, in effect, there
is no conflict.
What about such phrases as "center of gravity," and "most significant relation ship"? It seems the Court is prepared to choose one law when, after interpreting objects and examining governments' interests, there remains a conflict. How
this is to be done is nowhere explained in the opinion. It is not even clear whether
one is to weigh (albeit qualitatively, not quantitatively) "contacts" or "interests."
If interests are to be weighed, is some weight to be given to how important each
state feels its interest is, or does the weigher attempt to decide which interest is
more important? In any of these weighing processes, what are used for standard
weights?
C. The Legacy of Babcock v. Jackson
Since the decision in Babcock the New York courts have mentioned the
case by name or have referred to its new approach in more than forty cases.1°5
105. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 983 (.1965); LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Clarke v. Pennsylvania R.R., 341 F.2d 430 (2d
Cir. 1965); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965); George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964); King v. Hildebrandt, 331 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1964); Cooke v.
Drew & Co., 319 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1963); Phillips v. Murchison, 252 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Glenn v. Advertising
Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Cashman v. Evans, 249 F. Supp. 273
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Ciprari v. Services Aeros Cruzeiro, 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation, 242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Skahill
v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Public Adm'r of New York
County v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Pallen v. Allied Van
Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp.
50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591
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In more than half of these cases there was no more than a passing reference,
often simply to illustrate that conflicts rules are being reexamined. Among the
remaining cases, there are at least nine guest statute cases. 10 6 The approach has
been considered or applied in interspousal immunity cases,10 7 charitable institution immunity cases,'10 8 wrongful death actions, 0 9 dram shop acts,10 and many
others.
From this limited experience in New York, certain generalizations can be
made. In all cases the court tends to weigh contacts. In very few instances do
the courts examine the "interests" of states involved in detail, and, even when
they do, they fail to relate these "interests" to "contacts." The courts do not
always examine the same contacts, some courts making more complete lists than
others. The courts have mentioned: (1) the domicile of the plaintiff and defendant; (2) the residence of the plaintiff and defendant; (3) the place of the
accident; (4) the place where the journey commenced; (5) the place where
journey ended; (6) the place where the relationship between the parties was
formed; (7) the place where the automobile is usually garaged; (8) the place
(1966); Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513
(1965) ; Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) ; Oltarsh
v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965); Matter of Bauer,
14 N.Y.2d 272, 200 N.E.2d 207, 251 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1963); Kell v. Henderson, 26 A.D.2d
595, 70 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966); Steinberg v. Fischman, 24 A.D.2d 457, 260 N.Y.S.2d
403 (2d Dep't 1965); O'Hara v. Tidewater Oil Co., 23 A.D.2d 870, 259 N.Y.S.2d 263 (2d
Dep't 1965); Leonard v. O'Mara, 22 A.D.2d 835, 253 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3d Dep't 1964); Fornaro
v. Jill Bros., Inc., 22 A.D.2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 817,
205 N.E.2d 861, 257 N.Y.S.2d 938 (,1965); Matter of O'Conner, 21 A.D.2d 333, 250 N.Y.S.2d
696 (2d Dep't 1964); Blum v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 21 A.D.2d 683, 250 N.Y.S.2d
522 (2d Dep't 1964); Downs v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 19 A.D.2d 376, 243 N.Y.S.2d
640 (1st Dep't 1963) ; Root v. Kaufman, 48 Misc. 2d 468, 265 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Civil Ct. Bronx
Cty. 1965); Zucker v. Baker, 47 Misc. 2d 840, 263 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1965), rev'd,
26 A.D.2d 945, 274 N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't 1966); Taca Intl Airlines v. Rolls Royce of
England, Ltd.; 47 Misc. 2d 771, 263 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1965) ; Associates Discount Corp.
v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civil Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1965); Freund v. Spencer,
46 Misc. 2d 472, 260 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Murphy v. Barron, 45 Misc. 2d 905,
258 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Brewi v. Handrich, 45 Misc. 2d 121, 256 N.Y.S.2d 171
(Sup. Ct. 1965); McCullough v. Tilden, 44 Misc. 2d 256, 253,N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
aff'd, 25 A.D.2d 442, 267 N.Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dep't 1966); Manning v. Hyland, 42 Misc. 2d
915, 249 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 194, 247
N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Keller v. Greyhound Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 255, 244 N.Y.S.2d
882 (Sup. Ct. 1963); White v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 39 Misc. 2d 678,
241 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
106. Cashman v. Evans, 249 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18
N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120,
209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Kell v. Henderson, 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d
552 (3d Dep't 1966); Steinberg v. Fischman, 24 A.D.2d 457, 260 N.Y.S.2d 403 (2d Dep't
1965); Leopard v. O'Mara, 22 A.D.2d 835, 253 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3d Dep't 1964); Brewi v.
Hendrich, 45 Misc. 2d 121, 256 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1965); White v. Motor Vehicle Acc.
Indemnification Corp., 39 Misc. 2d 678, 241 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
107. Manning v. Hyland, 42 Misc. 2d 915, 249 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Keller
v. Greyhound Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 255, 244 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
108. Blum v. American Youth Hostels Inc., 21 A.D.2d 683, 250 N.Y.S.2d 522 (2d
Dep't 1964).
109. Skahill v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Berg v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. '1963); Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16
N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
110. Zucker v. Baker, 47 Misc. 2d 840, 263 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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where the automobile is insured; and (9) the place where the automobile is
licensed. For example, all of these factors except place of accident were mentioned as significant contacts in White v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification
Corp."" The place of accident was called purely fortuitous and by implication
insignificant. Nowhere does the court mention the interest or object of protecting
Ontario insurance companies from fraudulent claims and the related highly significant contact of an Ontario insurance company. No attempt at all was made
to relate the other "significant contacts" to this interest or policy objective.
In the typical case, the court, having listed the contacts with each state,
concludes, without further discussion, "in view of the predominance of the
Ontario contacts the theory of Babcock v. Jackson requires that the law of
2
Ontario be applied to the release.""1
The court, of course, denies it is simply counting contacts. However, by
considering "significant" contacts it seems to pick and choose upon whim.
Freund v. Spencer" 3 involved a head-on collision in Vermont, which has a gross
negligence guest statute. The New York court held that evaluation of the "center
of gravity" on a qualitative rather than a quantitative basis dictated application
of New York law, in determining whether a passenger could recover from her
host, when the guest-host relationship arose in Massachusetts (where the parties
had taken up temporary residence as students). The contacts with New York
that were mentioned were permanent residence of both parties in New York, the
fact that the host was licensed to drive in New York, the automobile was registered in New York and the owners of both vehicles involved in the collision
resided there. Once again there is no mention made of interest or policy objective
and once again the contact, the insurance company, was ignored. On the other
hand, the residence of the owner of another car involved in the accident was considered significant. No clue is given as to how this contact relates to what
Babcock v. Jackson" 4 found to be the interest of guest statute states. The case
is also interesting in view of Dym v. Gordon"0 because the Court failed to apply
Massachusetts law in a case in which the guest-host relationship arose where
both parties had taken up temporary residence as students.
The two cases mentioned above concern a problem where the Court of Appeals had described the guest statute state's interest and thereby inferred what
contacts should be significant. In spite of this, courts continue to pick and choose
among contacts according to their own table of Sigs. They are preoccupied with a
qualitative evaluation of contacts, but manage to do this without mentioning the
policy objective of protecting insurance companies from fraudulent claims and
its related contact, a guest statute state insurance company. In fact in at least
one guest statute case a court paid lip service to Babcock while applying the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

39 Misc. 2d 678, 241 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
Ardieta v. Young, 22 A.D.2d 349, 352, 256 N.Y.S.2d 199, 202 (4th Dep't 1965).
46 Misc. 2d 472, 260 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).

GUEST STATUTES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
traditional rule, when it said, "a comparison of the relative contacts and interests
of the States of New York and Vermont in this litigation ... makes clear that
the traditional rule should be applied. '' " The court is silent on the process by
which this result is reached. Perhaps the "grouping of contacts" theory would
7
be best renamed the "groping for contacts" theory."
The most interesting application of the new New York rule came in Dym.
In this case the plaintiff, a guest in the defendant driver's automobile, sought to
recover in New York for injuries which concededly were the result of the defendant host's ordinary negligence. Both the plaintiff and defendant were New York
domiciliaries, although the accident occurred in Colorado. Colorado has a guest
statute barring a guest's recovery against the host unless "wilful and wanton
disregard" of safety can be shown. So far the facts seem virtually identical with
Babcock and one would expect the application of New York law without too
much discussion. However, in this case both parties were summer students at the
University of Colorado. Without any prior arrangement, the defendant offered
the plaintiff a ride to a "place of instruction." During this trip the plaintiff
received his injuries in a collision with another car, driven by a resident from
Kansas and apparently licensed in that state.
The Court purports to apply Babcock:
Following our approach in Babcock, it is necessary first to isolate the
issue, next to identify the policies embraced in the laws in conflict, and
finally to examine the contacts of the respective jurisdictions to ascertain which has a superior connection with the occurrence and thus would
have a superior interest in having its policy or law applied." 8
Good, the reader may say, our work was done for us in Babcock. The issue here
is the same as in Babcock-whether or not a host should be liable to his guest.
Babcock has told us that the purpose of a guest statute is to protect local insurance companies. Since there is no Colorado defendant or insurance company,
Colorado has no "interest" in applying its law and New York law applies.
However, when one turns to the end of the decision he finds that the Colorado
statute was applied and the suit was dismissed. How, applying Babcock, could
this be? In Babcock the purpose or policy of a guest statute was determined by
the New York Court on general principles of what interests and policies are cognizable, and without regard to the case law of the foreign state involved. Such a
determination should be valid for all foreign guest statutes. If the Court in
Babcock ignored what Ontario thought the purpose of its law to be, so should it
now ignore what Colorado thinks the purpose of its law to be. What New York
determines to be the policy of guest statutes should remain constant. However,
116. Leonard v. O'Mara, 22 A.D.2d 835, 836, 253 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827 (3d Dep't 1964).
117. I am indebted to an obscure typographer employed by the printers of the Oklahoma Law Review who, presumably with little legal training, intuitively understood the
essence of the "grouping of contacts" theory and accordingly corrected the manuscript of a
student note. 18 Okla. L. Rev. 479, 481 (1965).
118. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466
(1965).
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this does not happen. A new multi-purpose explanation for the Colorado guest
statute is given. Why should the New York Court's determined imaginary policy
or purpose for guest statutes change from case to case according to which foreign
state is involved? It would seem that not only is the New York Court not bound
by a foreign court's determination of the policy or purpose of a guest statute,
but also it is not bound by previous decisions of the New York Court of Appeals.
The only other explanation is that the recognizable policy behind a guest statute
varies from state to state. That is, the purpose of the Ontario statute cannot be
to protect all insurance companies, but the purpose of the Colorado statute can
be. No reason is given for this departure from Babcock.
In Dym we learn that the New York Court finds, or at least will recognize,
that the policy underlying the Colorado law is three-fold: (1) the protection of
Colorado drivers and their insurance companies against fraudulent claims; (2)
the prevention of suits by "ungrateful guests!'; (3) the priority of injured parties
in other cars in the assets of the negligent defendant, i.e., "Colorado has an
interest in seeing that the negligent defendant's assets are not dissipated in order
that the persons in the car of the blameless driver will not have their right to
recovery diminished by the present suit."'1 9 From this it seems Colorado may
not have an interest in protecting out of state defendant drivers and their insurance companies, but it may have an interest in protecting other out of state
drivers involved in the accident.
The Court then comes to the issue of which state has more significant contacts with the case. They distinguish Babcock on the grounds that in Dym two
cars and a non-New York driver are involved. The Court says:
[In Babcock] we pointed out that the host-guest relationship was
seated in New York and that the place of accident was "entirely fortuitous." In this case the parties were dwelling in Colorado when the
relationship was formed and the accident arose out of Colorado based
activity; therefore, the fact that the 12accident
occurred in Colorado
0
could in no sense be termed fortuitous.
This is strange reasoning indeed. How can the place of accident be any the
less fortuitous because it, by chance, happens where a relationship was formed.
Surely the court is not saying that the formation of a "relationship" predetermines where the accident will happen. Perhaps all that is meant is that there are
other contacts with Colorado besides the occurrence of the accident there, and
that fortuitous (notwithstanding Mr. Webster) is used to mean solitary. The
Court could be forgiven for its solecism if it had made itself clear.
The Court then points out what it considers are the important contacts.
"Thus it is that in this case where Colorado has such significant contacts with
the relationshipitself and the basis of its formation the application of its law
and underlying policy are clearly warranted."'12 ' The Court does not relate these
119. Ibid.
120. Id. at 12g, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466-7.
121. Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
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contacts with the policy it has outlined for the Colorado statute. The Court did
not find that the Colorado statute was designed to protect relationships formed
in Colorado. If that is so, what has "the relationship itself" and "the basis of
its formation" to do with it? Some notion of what the Court had in mind is
indicated by the following statement:
Of compelling importance in this case is the fact that here the parties
had come to rest in the State of Colorado and had thus chosen to live
their daily lives under the protection arm of Colorado law. Having accepted the benefits of that law for such a prolonged period, it is spurious to maintain that Colorado has no interest in a relationship which
was formed there. In Babcock the New Yorkers at all times were in
transitu and we were impressed with the fundamental unfairness of subjecting them to a law which they in no sense had adopted. 122
Spurious or otherwise, by the Court's own description of the policy of the
Colorado statute, Colorado has no interest in its application simply because of
relationships formed there. Talk of "interest in a relationship" mixes interests
and contacts to such an extent that any guidance given by Babcock is completely
lost. In Babcock the Court looked at a state's interest or policy as reflected in
the law in issue, the guest statute, and then to see if there were contacts to support
this interest or policy. But now we have states being interested not in their laws,
but in contacts.
The second sentence of the above quotation introduces an element which
so far has not been used in the Babcock analysis. The Court there looks to what
law the parties have adopted. If the Court is serious about this, and, alas, it must
be because it later speaks of the factors of physical situs and time at which the
relationship was formed "in conjunction with the general intent of the parties as
inferred from their actions"''1 as being controlling, it opens a whole new area of
party autonomy in the conflict of tort laws.
The Court goes on to say that all the contacts with New York may be
classified under the heading domicile. "Certainly it is merely a long handed
method of reciting that the parties were domiciled in New York to state that the
car was registered here and that the insurance was written here." 24 The Court
calls New York's interest "public policy" and states, "Public policy, per se,
plays no part in a choice of law problem."'

25

The Court concludes, "Therefore Colorado, concerned with the fate of all
motorists on its highways, had the most significant contacts with the matter in
26
controversy and a dominant interest in it."'

In reading the opinion enough has been quoted to show that the ground is
never quite stable under one's feet. The Court purports to follow Babcock, but
122. Id. at 125,
123. Ibid.
124. Id. at 126,
125. Id. at 128,
126. Id. at 128,

209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
209 N.E.2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
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it widens the policy of guest statutes and, in fact, as the final quotation shows,
concludes that Colorado is concerned with the fate of all motorists on its highways. On the other hand it ignores New York policy and interest calling it
"public policy" which plays no part in the choice of law process. It picks the
place where the relationship was formed as the most significant contact while
at the same time saying that if the parties had agreed to this particular trip
while still in New York the same result would follow. From this it must mean
that temporary residence in Colorado was necessary. There is reference to intent
and acceptance of Colorado law. The Court dismisses the contacts with New
York as being all "domicile." It concludes that Colorado has the dominant interest presumably because it has the most significant contact or perhaps because of
Colorado's "interest" in this contact.
The Court may have argued that since it found that one of the policies of
Colorado's statutes was the prevention of suits by ungrateful guests, Colorado
had an interest in preventing all suits by guests against hosts unless wilful and
wanton misconduct was shown.1 27 With an interest so broad any number of
contacts would support it, and indeed there are several here. Thus we have a
conflict in recognized interests. We must now face the problem, avoided in
Babcock, of how to resolve this conflict. Since we do not wish to weigh the relative
merits of the two interests, we shall see which contacts are more significant. We
hold the general intent of the parties as inferred from their action is controlling.
(Of course intent is a legal fiction; what this really means is the law the parties
would have had in mind if they had thought about it.) 128 The intention of the
parties is found to be to have the law of the place where the relationship between
them was formed applied to later law suits. Such an approach would have been
more or less consistent with Babcock, answering some of the questions that case
left open. It would have been decided that when there is a real conflict of
recognized interest or policies, the solution is to be found in counting contacts
(albeit qualitatively).
Perhaps the true explanation of Dym is that it represents a real turn-about
in the New York Court. It should be stressed that Judge Fuld, who wrote the
opinion in the Babcock case, dissented in Dym. For all its lip service to Babcock,
perhaps the case marks a return to a mechanical rule-the place where the rela29
tionship between the parties was formed.
It is predicted, with respect, that future New York courts will not be aided
in their understanding of the New York rule by Dym v. Gordon. If anything,
it shows the New York Court of Appeals has not made up its mind about which
127. One must keep in mind that the Court would thereby overrule the earlier
Babcock case which holds that only an interest in protecting local insurance companies will
be recognized.
128. Optional; the use of this line would depend on how candid the court wanted
to be.
129. Professor Ehrenzweig discusses this fact as a facet of what he considers a "counterrevolution" in his article entitled A Counter-Revolution in Conflict Law? From Beale to
Cavers, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 377 (1966).
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direction to take. The discussion of an interest in a relationship (i.e., one of the
contacts) shows either the Court is confused or has added another element in the
analysis. When we count contacts, having assigned them Sig values, we must now
remember that some contacts get extra Sigs for having a benevolent paternal
state hovering about with an interest in their welfare.
The latest example of the confusion in New York is a decision of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 130 The
plaintiff was a Massachusetts resident, defendant a resident of New York. Both
plaintiff and defendant were employed by a theatrical company in its road show.
While the show was playing in Calgary, plaintiff and defendant made a trip to
Banff, Alberta. Plaintiff was injured on the return trip while riding in the
defendant's automobile, when that car collided with a car driven by an Alberta
resident. Defendant's car was registered in Illinois.' 3 ' Defendant claimed that
the Alberta gross negligence guest statute applied. The court agreed with the
defendant without specifically considering the purpose of the Alberta statute.
Nor did the court evaluate all the contacts. For example, while it mentions where
the car was registered, it did not say what "significance" this had.
The court held that New York public policy did not require an imposition of
liability upon a New York defendant in such a case as this: "I know of no
authority for a policy in New York which insists upon burdening New York
drivers with liability to non-residents because of the fortuitous circumstances
that the driver happens to be a New Yorker."' 32 The court then points out that
the contacts with Alberta were not fortuitous (Note once again the strange use
of "fortuitous" as a synonym for insignificant.). The opinion continues: "Both
parties were transacting business in Alberta at that time. Plaintiff as well as
defendant presumably came to Alberta deliberately, intentionally and knowingly." 33 Thus, as in Dym, we have the notion of the parties adopting a law.
The court goes on: "Furthermore, the fated trip began and was to end in Alberta.
Thus, it may be said that the guest-host relationship was formed in Alberta. ... "13- Again, as in Dym, the place where the relationship was formed is
considered significant.
To add more weight to its argument the court, taking up the suggestion of
Judge Burke in Dym, discovers that the "state in which the accident occurred
has an interest in preventing the dissipation of the negligent defendant's assets."' 35 Here the interest is just baldly stated. No pretense is made that this
interest is found by examining the Alberta guest statute.
Finally, the court suggests there may be a distinction between the outright
prohibition-of-suit type statute and the gross negligence statute. The court
130.
131.
but it did
132.
133.
134.
135.

Cashman v. Evans, 249 F. Supp. 273 (SMXN.Y. 1966).
The court also pointed out that the defendant had a New York driver's license
not say how this fact was relevant.
Cashman v. Evans, 249 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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suggests the gross negligence statute is concerned with standard of conduct and
quotes Judge Fuld in Babcock to the effect that where the defendant's exercise
of due care in the operation of his automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in
which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually have a predominant,
if not an exclusive, concern.
Of course for all this hocus pocus of interests, policies, contacts, significant
relationship, centre of gravity and now "concern," it is fairly safe to say that
future courts will simply look to see where the "relationship" between the guest
and host was formed. This may or may not be subject to a requirement of at
least temporary residence there. Hopefully talk of the parties intent and their
adoption of a particular law will be quietly dropped.
With this much difficulty in applying Babcock v. Jackson'"0 in guest statute
cases, it is not surprising that when the approach is applied to other issues, the
permutations and combinations of significant contacts are endless.
Occasionally the court applies Babcock without enumerating any contacts
and with no discussion of policies, interests, or concerns. 18 7 More often the court
lists the contacts with each state and using such phrases as "without a doubt, "' 138
"clearly," and "quite obviously,"' 139 comments that all the dominant contacts are
with one state. Since Dym, the contact place where the relationship between the
parties was formed, has come into its own.140 In fact, in an action against the
manufacturer of airplane engines for wrongful death arising out of an airplane
crash, the court looked to the place of injury and origin of the flight because "the
only contact, albeit a tenuous one, between the parties took place in Florida
where the injuries were sustained."'14 1 Now the court is identifying contacts and
relationships. In a theory so young it is impossible to expect purity of language
by the courts. It must be assumed that the court knew the "grouping of contacts"
theory refers to contacts between the parties to the dispute and a state. One of
these contacts can be the formation of a "relationship" within the state. But
even so, the court has introduced a new element by not restricting itself to the
formation of the relationship. It speaks simply of where "contact" takes place.
Since the journey began and ended in Florida there was no problem of a "contact" taking place in several states, but this could easily happen. But perhaps the
court impliedly means to look only to where the "contact" was first formed. In
any event, a much more serious problem is involved. How can the court realistically speak of a relationship being formed between a plaintiff airline passenger
136. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
137. Fornaro v. Jill Bros., Inc., 22 A-D.2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771 (3rd Dep't 1964);
Keller v. Greyhound Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 255, 244 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1963).
138. Manning v. Hyland, 42 Misc. 2d 915, 249 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
139. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
140. E.g., Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d
469 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Berg v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; Macey
v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Blum v. American
Youth Hostels Inc., 21 A.D.2d 683, 250 N.Y.S.2d 522 (2d Dep't 1964).
141. Berg v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra note 140, at 239 (Emphasis added.).
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and a defendant aircraft engine manufacturer when the passenger gets on board
a plane?
Another interesting case is Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware v. Fidelity
Mut. Life Ins. Co.,'14 where the court, not finding a permanent relationship
between the parties, speculates whether the preliminaries looking to the creation
of a relationship should be viewed as a "relationship of a kind" and looks to see
where it is centered. Why not say this preliminary relationship itself was not
quite finalized and look at the preliminaries to it? The court could go on ad
infinitum and ad nauseum.
There are also still some judges who refuse to accept the approach of
Babcock and make such statements as: "It may also be added that the court in
Babcock did not, except in a limited sense... , disavow or repudiate the traditional vested rights doctrine, i.e., the right to recover on a cause of action
created under the law of a foreign jurisdiction for a wrong occurring there and
which depends for its existence and extent solely on such law."'143 We can
sympathize with the judge for longing for the "good old days" when rules were
rules, and judges were bound to apply them.
A few other jurisdictions have expressly adopted the approach of Babcock.
Most of them use the circular device of "significant contacts," but never find one
contact determinative. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in a guest statute casO 44
cut through all the catchwords in refusing to apply the Nebraska guest statute
(the fortuitous place of accident). The general purposes of the Nebraska Statute
were listed as: (1) "preventing the ingratitude of a gratuitous guest who sues his
kindly host"; (2) "limiting the opportunity for collusive host-guests suits";
and (3) "the protection of the host and his insurer against judgments." The
court concluded: "But to the extent that such is the purpose of the law, it is the
Nebraska host and his insurance company that are the objects of the legal
policy. Nebraska policy is not concerned with a suit against a Wisconsin host or
a Wisconsin insurer."'145 While the court refrained from throwing in numerous
other contacts and policy considerations (with the minor exception of talk of
Wisconsin being the place whose law was anticipated and insured against), it
failed to articulate the fundamental premises on which its discovery of Nebraska
policy was based.
Trarnontanav. S.A. Empesa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense14 6 is another
example of a court primarily concerned with interest. The plaintiff, a Maryland
resident, sued in the District of Columbia for injuries caused by the death of
her husband. The deceased husband, Vincent Tramontana, died when the U.S.
142. 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963).
143. Murphy v. Barron, 45 Misc. 2d 905, 908, 258 N.Y.S.2d 139, 143 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
See also Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513
(1965); Taca Int'l Airlines v. Rolls Royce of England, Ltd., 47 Misc. 2d 711, 263 N.Y.S.2d
269 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
144. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
145. Id. at 632, 133 N.W.2d at 416.
146. 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1965).
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Navy plane in which he was a passenger collided with the defendant's airplane
in Brazil. The specific issue was whether the Brazilian limitation on recovery
applied. While the court mentions that the "'relationship' between the parties,
if it can be called that, existed fleetingly-and in Brazil,"'1 47 it clearly does not
take this seriously.
It also mentions the place where the accident happened, claiming this was
not fortuitous: "Vincent Tramontana could not have been killed by Varig's
Campos-to-Rio flight except in Brazil. To suggest that he might have been killed
here in the District, or in Maryland, by one of Varig's international flights is to
ignore the facts of this case."' 148 With respect, it is suggested that from the
plaintiff's point of view, since he was flying from Argentina to Brazil, the place
of accident was entirely fortuitous. If the court is suggesting that since this
particular accident could happen only where in fact it did happen (and to suggest
otherwise is to ignore the facts of the case) the place of accident is not fortuitous,
then the place of accident is never fortuitous.
However, this is just window dressing and the main thrust of the opinion is
an examination of Brazil's interest and a comparison with that of the forum and
Maryland (the state of the plaintiff's domicile). Essentially Brazil's interest is
found to be the protection of a Brazilian airline. This interest is given added
legitimacy because the defendant "as a national airline, is an object of concern
in terms of national policy. To Brazil, the success of this enterprise, is a matter
not only of pride and commercial well-being, but perhaps even of national
security."' 149 Depending on what is meant by "national" (i.e., whether it means
government-owned), there may be a suggestion that Brazil's interest is great
because, through public ownership of the airline, it is directly involved in the
litigation. Against Brazil's interest is set that of the forum. Since neither the
plaintiff nor her children were residents of the forum, there was no chance that
they would become public charges and a burden on the taxpayers of the District.
This interest in being free of public charges is the only one the court specifically
mentions. It seems strange that the only reason the District allows unlimited
recovery is to prevent burdens on its welfare system. However, the court recognizes that Maryland would have an interest, but it finds that Maryland courts
would apply the Brazilian limitation. This, in effect, means the court did not have
to weigh the competing interests.
Inasmuch as the court intimates that Brazil's interest would still govern even
if Maryland did not apply the lex loci delicti, the case illustrates an enormous danger of weighing interests. In order to properly balance interests, the court must be
sure it properly formulates the interest to be weighed. Both interests must be at
the same level of conceptual abstraction. If the court balances the interest of
Maryland in seeing that one of its citizens recovers against the interest of
147. Id. at 476.
148. Id. at 472.
149. Id. at 471.
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Brazil's national airline industry, the conclusion is predetermined. The interests
to be compared must be expressed in equivalent terms. This is by no means easy
and of course makes the weighing process almost impossible. For example, if the
cases had involved an injured party convalescing in a Maryland hospital that
would be paid for its services only if plaintiff collected unlimited damages, how
can an interest in national airlines be compared with an interest in state hospitals? Yet if the comparison is not made in these terms, the court will unconsciously be predetermining the outcome in formulating the interests.
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.150 involved a wrongful death action
where the issue was whether the limitation to the amount of damages found in
the law of the place of accident should apply. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
expressly weighed the interests involved. It found Pennsylvania's interest to be
greater, in part because of the number of contacts there, in part by reformulating
Pennsylvania's interest as a number of interests (e.g., interest in the administration of decedent's estate and interest in the well-being of surviving dependents),
and in part, one must assume, by some mystical intuitive process. The case is
another example of the danger inherent in weighing interests, of unconsciously
predetermining the greater interest by the manner in which the interests are
formulated.
From these few examples it can be seen that no other court has been any
more successful in articulating the exact nature of the rule, the guidelines that
are used to formulate a foreign interest, policy or purpose, or the set of values
used in any weighing process.
It is perhaps still too early to understand what the new New York rule is.
The Court has adopted much of the language of Morris,' 51 Currie, 152 and the
Restatement (Second).353 The Court occassionally refers to Ehrenzweig's place
where the car is licensed, insured and permanently garaged. This paper has
attempted to analyze a few of the cases in detail to see if a consistent rule or
approach has been developed. The task is exceedingly difficult because of the
Court's loose, confusing terminology and its habit of carrying around a whole
grab bag of ideas, theories, and "cepts" (i.e., incompletely formulated concepts).
In some decisions the bag is virtually upended on the judicial counter with the
reader invited to pick out what appeals to him. He is instructed not to be shy and
to pick out two or three. Nothing comes in sets so that if he picks the package
labelled "interest-protection of an Ontario insurance company" there is no need
to also take the one labelled "contact-Ontario insurance company." In fact,
as with the pieces of an "Erector" set, he is encouraged to build something for
himself.
However, it appears that two distinct approaches have been developed by the
150.

416 Pa. '1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).

151.
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Court since Babcock v. Jackson.15 4 The first approach is to avoid conflicting laws
by re-interpreting one or both in terms of policy considerations. All such catchwords as interest, governmental interests, purposes, policy, and concern can be
subsumed under this approach. There is no difference between discussing the
purpose of a rule and governmental interest. If governmental interest means anything, it means an interest in seeing a policy (as reflected in a rule of law) implemented. While it is true the courts occasionally refer to interests in the parties,
in the issue, or in the contact, these expressions are either abbreviations for the
idea of an interest in a policy coupled with some contact in the particular case
sufficient for the interest to be recognized, or they are meaningless.
In essence this is the governmental interest anaylsis of Currie. However, in
Babcock the Court confines its search for "interests" to the interest in effecting
a particular policy evidenced by a particular law. The analysis in Dym v.
Gordon'55 and Cashman v. Evans'56 went beyond this, however, to the more
vague notion of any interest which, while not found directly in the law in question, it can be assumed a state has, and which will be furthered by the application
of its law. For example, the notion that states are interested in protecting hospital
and medical creditors is a secondary interest, not found directly in the liability
rule sought to be imposed, but developed from a more general assumption that
all states are interested in their residents. Hence, in cases where neither party is
a resident, this secondary interest may come into play, if there is a local hospital
or local medical practitioner seeking to be paid.
It is important to recognize that this process is workable only because it is
a creative process. Governmental interests and purposes or policies must be
fashioned by the courts. We are always talking about an imaginary court-created
interest or policy. The only objective standard to know what a state's interest or
policy is, is to see how its courts will apply the law. This either gets one nowhere
-by hypothesis we have conflicting rules of law-or gets one into the process
known as renvoi. This is not what the New York Court does. It does not say, for
example, the Ontario interest as reflected in its guest statute is to protect all
insurance companies because that is, in effect, how the Ontario courts have acted.
Rather it fashions what is considered to be a suitable interest or policy, one that
it can recognize. In this way, as in Babcock (in fact, in most cases so far) the
dispute is solved because only one of these newly fashioned interests is found to
be applicable.
This process is highly sophisticated and highly dangerous. There seems to
be little if any control or guidance for the court in fashioning these interests.
The way in which the interest is fashioned largely predetermines the outcome.
And what should be done if the two ideal interests are both applicable and lead
to conflicting results is still open to speculation.
The one principle we can safely extract is that an interest in protecting a
194. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
155. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
156. 249 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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class of people will be re-interpreted or re-defined in terms of an ideal or
recognizable interest of protecting the domiciliaries or residents of that class. This
is, of course, open to the criticism of Robert A. Leflar that:
Most American states today are as much concerned with protecting the
bodies and property of visitors as of residents. They are concerned with
applying their legal policies to people and to interests and activities of
people, not just to local citizens. This does not mean that residence is
not one touchstone for "governmental interest" or most "significant contacts." But it is not the keystone.' 57
Whatever the real interest of states may be in the court's application of
governmental interests, it is safe to say that residence has become the keystone.
The second approach, illustrated by Dym, is to concentrate on those facts
which point to one or another of the states whose laws are being considered. For
this purpose all the traditional connecting factors are considered, but the court
is not shy about inventing new ones. The various "contacts," as these connecting
factors are now called, are given different weights or assigned different values.
Sometimes an attempt is made to relate the contact with an interest, and thereby
enhance its value, but no court is willing to say one contact is determinative.
Since no contact is determinative (since Dym it may be hard to persuadd the
courts that this is true) and contacts do not have constant values in relation to
one another (in spite of the efforts of the Restatement (Second)) this approach
is completely arbitrary. In determining "significant" contacts and in determining the "centre of gravity" each court "groups" and "gropes" on its own.
Most courts, of course, use both approaches and never distinguish between
the two. As well, cutting across these two approaches there may be developing
a new fixed rule which looks to the place where the relationship between the
parties was formed (Dym and Cashman).

IV. THE

CANADIAN AND NEw

A.

Yoiuc RuLEs ComT' AD

The Different Approaches

At first blush any difference between the Canadian and New York rules may
seem to be the difference between the quest for legal certainty and the quest for
justice in individual cases. In a sense this is generally true. However, it would be
more than generous to the Canadian courts to assume they were consciously seeking legal certainty. It is perhaps more accurate to say that these two rules
represent in microcosm two stages in the development of choice of law theory, two
attitudes towards the theory of precedents and two levels of consciousness of the
function of the courts in one of the last truly common law subjects.
The opinions of the Canadian courts in this area, as well as in the whole
field of choice of law, are comparatively free of theoretical discussion. The hornbook law of Dicey' 58 is cited more or less as if it were statutory, and the appro157. Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1247, 1250 (1963).
158. Dicey, Conflict of Laws 799 (Morris ed. 1949).
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priate rule is mechanically applied. There is no reference to academic writers
even on the most controversial subjects. In conflict of laws, as in other fields,
there is a parochial prejudice against American authority. English authority is
unhesitatingly accepted although the guest statute problem does not exist in
English private international law, while American authority is completely ignored although the problem has been frequently discussed and handled by American courts.
The New York courts, in contrast, have in recent years been pre-occupied
with the theoretical justification for their rule. Support is accepted from any
source and there is nearly always some discussion of the theories of leading
academic writers.
In the Canadian courts great weight has been put on nicety of expression.
For example, the whole tort rule carefully distinguishes between "actionable"
and "justifiable." On the other hand, the New York rules' most serious failing
is vague, loose terminology.
It is of course well known that the attitude of Canadian and American
courts towards precedent differs. 159 It is also well known that American courts
are most straightforward about their lawmaking role. These differences in attitude are reflected in their different treatment of theory, academic writers,
foreign authority, and judicial language. However, they do not explain such
divergent results. After all, Canadian judges are no less sensitive to the need for
justice than their American counterparts. While they have different notions of
the relative role of the legislature and judiciary and different ideas about how
articulate judges should be in changing and modifying old rules, it must be
assumed they know full well that in the field of conflict of laws the legislature is
not likely to act.
The difference must be found primarily in the relatively underdeveloped
state of Canadian conflicts law. Whether this testifies to the success of the Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada or the greater mobility of
Americans, the fact is that there are a far greater number and variety of conflicts
problems coming before American courts. There have been approximately fifty
reported cases in Canada involving conflicts problems including jurisdiction,
recognition of foreign judgments, and choice of law during the past ten years.
In fact, if the needed reform in divorce law had been undertaken, this number
would be reduced to approximately thirty. In contrast New York state alone
159. It is difficult to imagine a Canadian court being as forthright as the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania when it stated in Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d
796 (1964):
We acknowledge that in adopting a new approach in the area of choice of law,
of necessity, we overrule our earlier cases based on the lex loci delicti rule. But we
must not perpetuate an obsolete rule by blind adherence to the principle of stare
decisis. Although adherence to that principle is generally a wise course of judicial
action, it does not rigidly command that we follow without deviation earlier pronouncements which are unsuited to modern experience and which no longer adequately serve the interest of justice.
Id. at 23, 203 A.2d at 806.
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has had approximately fifty cases concerned with conflict of tort laws in the
three years since Babcock v. Jackson. 60 When a problem only comes before the
courts two or three times in a generation, it is not surprising that a broad rule
of thumb is used.
B.

The Results Compared

In examining the respective results reached by the Canadian and New York
courts it is useful to keep in mind the objectives of choice of law rules. This is
not to suggest that general a priori principles can be established to cover all
choice of law questions or even all choice of law questions in tort cases. We have
learned from our experience with the vested rights theory the danger of attempting to deduce the true choice of law rules from a general theory as to the nature
of conflict of laws. Yet it is helpful when attempting to assess alternative proposals for the solution of specific conflicts problems to know, even if only in a
general way, what is being attempted. Why does a court in some cases involving
foreign elements concern itself with the question of what law it should apply?
Professor Yntema in a classic article lists some of the objectives as,
uniformity of legal consequences, minimization of conflicts of laws,
predictability of legal consequences, the reasonable expectations of the
parties, uniformity of social and economic consequences, validation of
the transaction, relative significance of contacts, recognition of the
"stronger" law, co-operation among states, respect for interests of other
states, justice of the end results, respect for policies of domestic law,
internal harmony of the substantive rules to be applied, location or
nature of the transaction, private utility, homogeneity of national law,
ultimate recourse to the lex fori, and the like. 61
The list is highly tautological and includes methods suggested to implement
objectives and a residual rule to guide the courts when the objectives cannot be
implemented.
Neuner sees the objects of choice of law rules as giving effect to the expectation of the parties, preventing the decision from depending on the fortuitous place
62
of the trial and reaching a just result.
Reese has enumerated ten policies which should guide courts in formulating
rules for choice of law. 163 Other academic writers have seized on one or another of
these policies as being all important. For example, for Lorenzen, "The general
problem is therefore, always the same: What are the demands of justice in the
particular situation: What is the controlling policy?"' 64 Through most of the
writings on the subject run the old chestnuts: certainty, simplicity, predictability,
160. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
161. Yntema, The Objectives of Private InternationalLaw, 35 Can. B. Rev. 721, 73435 (1957).
162. Neuner, Policy Considerationsin the Conflict of Laws, 20 Can. B. Rev. 479 (1942).
163. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob.
679, 682-90 (1963).

164. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J.
736, 748 (1924).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
and uniformity of result. In many, justice is mentioned and there is a common
uneasiness over an accidental forum applying its own law.
However, it is impossible to make an exhaustive list. Some writers seem to
downgrade all the traditional objectives. For example, Currie suggested that
conflict of laws should be redefined as that branch of the law designed to deal
with conflicts between the interests of two or more states in applying the policies
embodied in their respective laws. 165
As mentioned above, the Canadian rule is in all cases strictly applied.
Whether or not it is a simple rule is open to question, but at least it is certain.
Of course, in its application to guest statutes it results in the forum applying its
own law. There is no uniformity-outcome depends on where suit is brought. This
means that after the accident and before suit is brought it is impossible to predict
whether the passenger will be able to sue successfully. However, after suit is
brought, the law that will be applied is predictable, facilitating compromise or
settlement. The rule, of course, in its invariable application does not attempt to
do justice in the particular case, and it completely ignores the expectations of
the parties. So far the Canadian courts have never concerned themselves with the
policy embodied in their laws or whether any state has an interest in having its
law applied. Of the ten policies that Reese enumerates the Canadian rule meets
only one and then by accident. That is, the court applies its own local law. However, this is not the result of a conscious decision that there is no good reason
for not doing so.
In contrast the New York rule does seek to do justice in the individual case.
While it does not overtly look to the expectations of the parties, this factor is
given some play in assessing significant contacts, policies, purposes and interests.
The rule is neither simple, certain, nor predictable. For example, in the problem
posed in the introduction for each passenger the purpose of at least the laws of
Massachusetts, New York and Ontario must be examined, and it may be
necessary to look at the laws of Quebec and Saskatchewan. We must determine
how significant are such contacts as the parties' domiciles, where the journey
started and ended, where each relationship is formed, where each passenger was
hospitalized, where the car was garaged, licensed and insured, where the accident
occurred and any other the litigants' counsel may be ingenious enough to invent.
And finally we must decide which states have recognizable interests and in the
case of each passenger which state has the greatest interest. With so many
variables only a Philadelphia lawyer could predict the result. As the contrast
between Babcock and Dym shows, it does not even lead to uniform results within
one court. The rule has not been adopted by enough other states nor for a long
enough period of time to compare results, but it is safe to predict uniformity of
result will not be achieved. The rule does of course consider the policies embodied
in the conflicting laws and does consider states' interests. How successful this has
165.

Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 754, 756 (1963).
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been depends entirely on whether the policies and interests the courts have
created are found satisfactory.
V.

SUGGESTED THEORIES

The courts have been supplied with a wealth of ideas and theories from
which to choose. The lex fori, lex patriae, lex loci delicti, and various compromises between the lex Jori and the lex loci delicti have all been advanced as possible solutions for conflict of tort laws cases. In recent years, at least four other
well known unconventional solutions have been suggested. These solutions are
Morris' "proper law,"' 6 Currie's "governmental interest,"' 67 the Second Restatement's "most significant relationship,"1 68 and Ehrenzweig's "place where the
car is [permanently] garaged."'1 9
A.

Morris

The "proper law" theory of Morris does not go further than suggesting that
the existing lex loci delicti rule applied to all conflict of tort law cases does not
always lead to "socially desirable results." In its place he suggests that a court
should apply the "proper law" of the tort. By the "proper law" Morris means
"the law which, on policy grounds, seems to have the most significant connection
with the chain of acts and consequences in the particular situation' 70 before the
court. In this manner a desirable flexibility would be introduced into the system
and it would enable the problems to be broken down into smaller groups:
A proper law approach, intelligently applied, would furnish a much
needed flexibility. It may be conceded that in many, perhaps, most,
situations there would be no need to look beyond the law of the place of
wrong, so long as there is no doubt where that place is. But we ought
to have a conflict rule broad and flexible enough to take care of exceptional situations as well as the more normal ones, or else we must formulate an entirely new rule to cope with the exceptional situations.
7
Otherwise the results will begin to offend our common sense.' '
Morris also suggests that the search for the proper law involves a "sophisticated inquiry into problems of causation and foreseeability coupled with a
72
balancing of the interest of the states whose law is involved."' He does not
166.
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explain how a connection is determined to be most significant or how a state's interest is determined. The theory is not completely developed but is rather the
forerunner to the Second Restatement's "significant relationship" and Currie's
(Cgovernmental interest." While the New York court has not adopted the phrase
'"proper law" it has adopted much of the language and all of the vagueness of
Morris' theory.
B.

The Restatement Second

The Restatement (Second) has also developed a new rule for all cases of
conflict of tort laws. In its usual black letter law fashion it states:
Section 379. The General Principle:
(1) the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines
their rights and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties, and,
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the
tort and
forum will consider the issues, the character of 7the
the relevant purposes of the tort rules involved.' 3
In the notes that follow,1t 4 it is explained that the important contacts have
been listed in order of importance. However, how much more important one is
than the other is not described. For example, the notes tell us that the place of
injury is more important than domicil, but they do not tell us if the place of
injury is sufficient to outweigh one, two, or three of the other important contacts.
We also learn from the notes that these contacts are not exclusive: "Any contact which can reasonably be said to be of significance in connecting the occurrence and the parties with a given state will be considered by the courts."11 5 In
determining the relative importance of the contacts, "the forum will consider
the issues, the character of the tort and the relevant purposes of the tort rules
involved. 1 '0
Upon examining the notes we find that, "usually, all issues involving a tort
will have their most significant relationship with a single state and will therefore
be governed by a single law." 177 Exceptions are then given where states have the
"greatest interest" in a particular issue. This idea of a state's "interest" is not
mentioned in section 379 but perhaps it is behind the whole concept of "most
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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significant relationship." For the usual case, where all issues are referred to a
single law, the process must be very complicated indeed. It is not clear whether
one is to consider the relative importance of the contacts in relation to each issue
individually and then, somehow, try to sum up to arrive at a single law, or
whether the first step is to pick out the important issue in each tort and then see
which contacts are most significant.
The notes go on to say that the relative importance of the contacts vary
somewhat with the kind of tort involved. Illustrations are given-e.g., the
place of injury is of particular importance in the case of personal injuries and of
injuries to tangible things but is less significant in the case of fraudulent misrepresentation. 178 No convincing reasons are given why this is so. The notes only
show that this is axiomatic for the reporter.
The notes on the third factor, the basic purpose of the tort rule, are no more
helpful. The notes indicate a distinction should be made between admonitory and
compensatory torts, the place of conduct being 'the state of greatest interest and
thus of most significant relationship" in the former and the place of plaintiff's
domicile being the state of "greatest interest" in the latter. 7 9 (Once again we
have "interested states.") Also the class intended to be protected should be
considered.
The conclusion is inevitable that the Restatement (Second) gives no rule
at all. Nor does it offer any useful guide to the courts on how to develop a new
rule or rules. It does no more than list a few well known contacts and some factors
which it feels the courts should consider. It ties these all together by admonishing
the court to apply the law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the occurrence and the parties, but seems to recognize that this will be any
law that the courts decide to pick.
C.

Currie

The most widely discussed and perhaps most controversial theory 8 0 in
recent years is Currie's "governmental interest" analysis. Unlike Morris' "proper
law" and the Second Restatement's "most significant relationship," this governmental interest analysis is not confined to conflict of tort laws. It is a general
approach to all choice of law problems. To Currie the court will ordinarily apply
forum law as a matter of course. What happens when it is asked to apply another
law is best explained in Currie's own restatement:
178. Comment c to § 379, id. at 8.
179. Id. at 8-9.
180. See, e.g., Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 463 (1960); Summer, Choice of Law Rules: Deceased or
Revived?, 7 U.CJ,.A.L. Rev. 1 (1960); Cavers, Book Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1327 (1953);
Kramer, Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 523 (1959);
Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems, 1959 Wash. U.L.Q. 37; Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 36 (1961); Cheatham, Problems and Methods in Conflict
of Laws, 99 Recueil des Cours 237 (1960); Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's
Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 845 (1961).
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Section 1. When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign state
different from the law of the forum, it should enquire into the policies
expressed in the respective laws, and into the circumstances in which it
is reasonablefor the respective states to assert an interest in the application of these policies. In making these determinations the court should
employ the ordinary process of construction and interpretation. 1 8'
Having determined which states may reasonably assert an interest, the court
should then apply the law of a foreign state with a reasonably asserted interest
only in cases where it is the only state with an interest. In all other cases, and
most particularly where the forum state has an interest, forum law is applied.
The fact that this leads to a disinterested third state applying its own law has
been the subject of much comment.18 2 While it is not altogether clear from this
statement, the governmental interest as envisaged by Currie is not strictly confined to the purpose embodied in the law being construed or interpreted. The
italicized words indicate what Currie has suggested numerous times in his writings-even though on interpreting the law and finding its policy, the state would
have no cognizable interest in its application, if there is some independent fact
which makes the state desirous of having its law applied, it has an interest. For
example, in guest statute cases Currie suggested that the state where the accident
occurred would have an interest in "deterring wrongful conduct within its borders
and in providing a fund for the protection of local medical creditors."' 83 This
interest of protecting local medical creditors can hardly be the result of construing or interpreting the law imposing liability on drivers for their negligent
conduct.
Currie himself only saw his approach as a means to eliminate what it has
become fashionable to call "false" or "spurious" conflicts.' 84 In cases of "real"
conflicts the court, not being in a position to "weigh" competing interests, would
apply forum law. This new widespread device of examining policies and interests
in cases like Babcock and concluding the case is one of "false" conflict is highly
misleading. It pretends that it has not been necessary to invoke a choice of law
process while in reality the choice of law has been made under the guise of
construction and interpretation.
To a plaintiff faced with two opposite conclusions on the same facts depending on where he sues, talk of a "false" conflict will be meaningless. Of course it
is hoped that once the choice of law process is invoked the conflict in a sense will
disappear. For example, if all courts apply the lex loci delicti there is no conflict
between the law applied to any particular facts wherever suit is brought.
Nevertheless, there is a very real difference in Ontario and New York domestic law. If neither state has a device for dealing with cases with foreign elements,
181.
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different results will follow on the same facts. New York certainly can attempt
to solve this conflict by saying Ontario has no interest and applying New York
law. But this is a choice of law rule and it serves no useful purpose to pretend
otherwise. As well, the sad fact remains that the Ontario court, not being so enlightened about the purpose of its own law or its own state's interest, continues
to apply its own law. Hence, both before and after the choice of law process has
been invoked a very real conflict exists. What is to be gained by calling it a
"false conflict"?
The only truly spurious or false conflicts are those few cases where all states
having any connection with a suit would have reached identical results if the
occurrence had been intrastate in character, but because of the rigid application
of traditional territorially oriented choice of law rules, a different result is
reached simply because a state line is crossed. The typical example of this is a
case like Nelson v. Eckert 8 5 where neither the Arkansas nor Texas two year
statute of limitation was applied because of dual- classification (i.e., forum
statute did not apply because it was substantive, the lex loci delicti statute did
not apply because it was procedural).
The governmental interest rule, as envisaged by Currie, is essentially a two
step operation. First, purposes and policies are extrapolated from the conflicting
laws to determine what are the respective state's interest. Second, given these
interests either the only relevant state interest is applied or if each state has an
interest a choice between them is made. (Currie and many of his disciples part
company when it comes to making a choice when two interests are relevant.) The
discovery and labelling of "false" conflicts results from a failure to appreciate
the true nature of the first step in the governmental interest analysis.
The two steps are regarded as being essentially different. The first step, the
discovery of the interests, is seen, as an almost automatic process involving, for
Currie, only interpretation and construction. It may be that the court can find
the policy, purpose and hence state interest of the forum state by a process of
construction and interpretation. However, as shown above, the discovery and
definition of the foreign state's interest is entirely a fictional process. Nor does
the process become any more real or routine to suggest, as Kramer does, that
the court simply looks to see whether the "governmental interests behind
the [foreign] state's policy are such that the state has a logical, rational, legitimate cause to apply its laws to the case in question ....
Some may still wonder what is illogical, irrational and illegitimate about
Ontario's seeking to protect all insurance companies. In fact if we define the interest (as we are free to do since its definition is in no way what any agency in
Ontario has said it is) as an interest in seeing an enlightened rule which seeks to
force everyone to carry his own insurance and remove the charade of automobile
litigation from the courts applied wherever possible, what makes this so obviously
185.
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illogical, irrational or illegitimate? Even in the case of the forum interest, when
discussion turns to an interest in the protection of local medical creditors, this is
fairly creative construction or interpretation.
It is this notion (that in the first step the courts are only applying, in an
intelligent way, laws that are given) that has lead to the concept of false conflict. To Currie a false conflict does not result from a creative choice of law process by the court, but is discovered by construction and interpretation and relieves
the court of the burden of making a choice of law.
On the other hand the second step is recognized by Currie as being a creative
process. This step is essentially different from the first and the only way it can
be done is by the court's applying forum law:
Where several states have different policies, and also legitimate interests
in the application of their policies, a court is in no position to "weigh"
the competing interests, or evaluate their relative merits, and choose
between them accordingly ...When the court, in a true conflict situation, holds the foreign law applicable, it is assuming a great deal: it is
holding the policy, or interest, of its own state inferior and preferring
the policy or interest of the foreign state .... The task is not one to be
performed by a court. Assessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine
which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order. This 187
is
a function which should not be committed to courts in a democracy.
However, as Alfred Hill has pointed out, 188 even in interpreting governmental interests so as to avoid conflicts, the court is undertaking a political
function "of a very high order." Moreover by confining his attention to "specific,
limited" interests rather than "general"' 189 interests, Currie was mistaken about
the nature of the second step in his analysis. If a broader view is taken of the
forum's governmental interest and an interest in promoting uniformity, certainty
and predictability is included, it may be the court will find that these interests
outweigh the specific forum interest. They may find that the broader more important forum interests can best be achieved by applying the foreign law. Currie
has said:
The fallacy is in the assumption that this is the dominant and characteristic aspect of the process of choice of law-in the assumption that
when a particular foreign interest is preferred to a particular local
interest, the courts of the forum have necessarily sacrificed the interests
of the forum. As has been observed, it is probably more likely that the
result is actually a vindication of the over-all governmental interests of
the forum, and that the particular local interest involved in the litigation has been defeated not so much by a competing foreign interest as
187.
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by competing local interests which may be specific or quite general in
character.' 9 0
The truth of the matter seems to be that both steps in the process are open
to the very criticism Currie himself made against courts choosing between
interests. In order for the governmental interest analysis to get off the ground,
interests must be, if you will, manufactured. If this were not true the system,
as Currie saw it, would collapse and the courts would simply apply forum law in
all conflicts cases. At one point he seems to have thought that each state's courts
were the ultimate arbiter of the state's interest:
It was not for me to judge whether the claims of Arizona were logical
and consistent; it was for the Arizona courts to declare the interests of
the state, and if their determination could not be stigmatized as constitutionally unreasonable, it must be accepted....
Determination of the policy expressed in a state's law, and of the state's
interest in applying that policy to cases involving foreign elements, is
not distinctively the task of the conflict of laws technician. It is the task
of the specialist in the type of domestic law involved, e.g., the law of
torts, or contracts, or mortgages, ultimately, it is for determination by
the state's courts in the light of all expert knowledge that can be brought
to bear.1 1
If this were true we would always look to see what the foreign court did and would
be hard put to find no interest when that court habitually applied its own law.
The governmental interest analysis is predicated on the ability of the forum to
decide for itself on either how the foreign state's interest will be formulated or
alternatively whether an interest articulated by a foreign court will be recognized.
If the problems inherent in weighing interests are recognized (as Currie
did) how is the situation different in the unguided process of formulating interests? The following statement clearly shows the danger of both steps:
Certainly the personal preferences of the Justices among the conflicting
state policies is not a permissible basis of determining which shall prevail
in a case. But only a singularly balanced mind would weigh relative
state interest in such subject matter except by resort to what are likely
to be strong preferences in sociology, economics, governmental theory,
and politics. There are no judicial standards of valuation of such imponderables. How can we know which is the greater interest when one
state is moved by a set of considerations-economic, perhaps-to one
considerations-social welfare, perhaps
policy, and another by different
92
-to a conflicting one?'
The only judicial standards that seem to be assumed in Currie's theory is
that interests that are recognized are formulated in terms of interest in the welfare of certain classes of residents.
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Justice Traynor in his praise of Currie's rule states that its application to a
case like Auten v. Auten' 03 would have avoided "the question-begging presupposition, railed against for years by critics of super-law, that in the nature of
things some single, transcendental rule, some categorical imperative, governs a
transaction.' 19 4 However, in deciding which interest will be recognized or in
defining the fictional foreign state's interest, is there not some single, transcendental rule or categorical imperative such as states can and do have a logical,
rational and legitimate interest only in their own residents?
D.

Ehrenzweig

95

To Ehrenzweig'
the solution in guest statute cases must be found by
considering the interest of the parties in the light of forum policy. The choice of
law rule "must be sought against the background of economic realities rather
than dogmatic fancies .... Among the primary interests involved are the interests of the host in procuring a liability insurance adequate under the applicable
law, and the interests of his insurer in reasonable calculability of the premium."' 1 6
For Ehrenzweig, both these interests are most effectively protected under the
law of the states where the insured car is permanently kept, a lav whose application may be anticipated by both host and guest.
VI. A

SUGGESTED SOLUTION

The central difficulty in formulating a new choice of law rule has been the
insistence on formulating one for all torts cases. As soon as an attempt is made
to cover such a broad category the age-old problem of how to promote legal
certainty and at the same time satisfy the demands of justice in the individual
case appears. The answer of Morris, Currie, the Restatement (Second) and now
the New York Court is to devise a single new flexible rule for all torts cases.
These people recognize the problem they face. Reese, in writing of the need for
somewhat fluid rules in the Restatement wrote, "To be sure, a rule should not
be stated so broadly that it would be consistent with almost any result that a
court might reach. Such a rule would in effect be no rule at all. On the other
hand, rules cannot bring certainty and predictability to a subject in which these
' 97
values do not exist."'
Also, Currie has written:
The question will inevitably be asked: If the government-interest
analysis of Babcock v. Jackson is to prevail, must all choice-of-law
problems be solved on an ad hoc basis, or will new generalizations be
possible? My response is that, for the time being, at least, new efforts
193. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
194. Traynor, supra note 180, at 851.
195. For Ehrenzweig's more general theory, see his Conflict of Laws (1962); Choice
of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 Calif. L. Rev. 240 (1960); The Lex ForiBasic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960).
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197. Reese, supra note 163, at 681.
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to find short cuts and synthesis should be sternly discouraged. We are
beginning to recover from a long seige of intoxication resulting from
for a while, at least, total abstinence
overindulgence in generalities;
1 8
should be enforced. 0
However, Currie did not heed his own advice. Recognizing the "long seige
199
he nevertheless
of intoxication resulting from overindulgence in generalities,"'
of this
criticism
succinct
built the largest generality of all. Perhaps the most
economy
"the
said,
he
vast generalization was made by Paul Henrich Neuhaus;
of the process of adjudication dictates that the great volume of civil cases be
decided according to clear-cut rules without a judicial repetition of the frequently quite involved legislative thought process; this precludes a weighing
of all possibly relevant interests .... -200
It is presumptuously suggested that Ehrenzweig is on the right track. Our
attempts should be confined to formulating a rule for guest statute cases. Once
this particular problem is solved then maybe that solution will point to the
right solution in other areas. But if we start out attempting to solve all problems
at once we fall back to the "intoxication" of the past. Ehrenzweig's plea that a
rule should be sought "against the background of economic realities rather than
dogmatic fancies" 20 ' is also laudable. If economic realities are considered, the
insurance company will be seen as one of the real disputants in the litigation.
In order to meet the demands of justice, a law must be applied that can be
foreseen by those who need to foresee so that insurance can be arranged accordingly. However, in the guest statute case, unlike cases of interspousal immunity,
the parties involved (guest, host and insurance company) may easily reside in
different states. In the face of this, Ehrenzweig has attempted to pick a state the
application of whose law all could foresee. In spite of his plea for the observance
of economic realities, Ehrenzweig has mistakenly assumed all parties need to
foresee which law is applied. He has also mistakenly assumed that the law of the
garage is one which the passenger can foresee and can arrange his insurance
accordingly. But passengers cannot realistically be expected to arrange insurance
every time they go for a ride. When they consider insurance, once a year or
every few years, one can only realistically expect them to act according to the
law of the place where they reside. Ehrenzweig's solution in effect means all
passengers must assume they may someday ride in a car from a guest statute
state, so they must carry their own accident insurance.
On the other hand the insurance company does not care which law is applied.
Insurance rates are calculated on historical data. They are set not for the individual insured, but for a whole class of automobile drivers. Using theories of
probability the insurance company can just as readily calculate premiums even
198.
199.

Currie, supra note 152, at 1241.
Ibid.

200. Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 795, 805 (1963).
201. Ehrenzweig, supra note 169, at 580.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
if the courts act completely arbitrarily in choosing a law.202 Also, in view of the
many other variables in determining rates,203 "economic reality" compels us to
admit that there is no compelling reason why the insurance companies should
want one law to be applied in all cases involving accidents with a particular car.
It is no answer to this to argue, as Ehrenzweig has, that although insurance
companies do not in fact calculate the premium according to the law of the
permanent garage, at least they could. In so arguing Ehrenzweig is inconsistent.
Either economic realities are to be considered or they are to be ignored. You
cannot arbitrarily reject some economic realities. If all that is wanted is a law
that everyone can foresee, it might as well be Currie's law of Alaska; 20 4 this
also has the merit of being a novel solution. However, the real point is that not
only do the insurance companies not act this way, but there is no desirable
reason why they should. The suggestion that they could more rationally calculate
premiums is open to doubt, and in view of the many other more important
variables in calculating premiums is not important enough to subject the passenger to an unexpected law.
The only other party concerned is the host. It is interesting to note that in
Canada and at least in New York, if he has insurance, he does not care what law
is applied. Under the insurance acts of all the common law provinces and the
Territories 0 5 he is insured against "liability imposed by law" for loss or damage
arising from the ownership or operation of an automobile in Canada or the continental United States. The same result is reached under New York law. 200 This
means that no matter what law is applied, if liability is imposed on the driver,
the insurance company must pay. Even if all states do not have such a rule, and
it is possible that drivers can obtain insurance which excludes coverage for
liability to passengers, is it not more realistic to expect the host, rather than the
guest, to insure against all possible liability?
Examining "economic realities" and "discarding dogmatic fancies" points
to a rule which applies the law of the residence of the guest in guest statute cases.
This is the law that can be foreseen by the one party who, in reality, can and
should act according to what he foresees. It is a simple rule, leads to uniformity
202. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 554 (1960).
203. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 Mich. L.
Rev. 689, 718-25 (1960). Mr. Peck shows that if the introduction of comparative negligence
in Arkansas in June, 1965, did affect insurance rates, "Its effect is not great enough to be
observable in the complex of forces acting on the rate level." (id. at 722).
204. Currie, Conflict, Crisisand Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke LJ. 1, 10.
205. Insurance Act, Rev. Stat. Alberta ch. 159, § 294 (1955) ; Insurance Act, Rev. Stat.
B.C. ch. 197, § 232 (1960) ; Insurance Act, Rev. Stat. Man. d. 126, § 219 (1954) ; Insurance Act, Rev. Stat. N.B. d. 113, § 203 (1952); Automobile Insurance Act, Rev. Stat. N.S.
ch. 18, § 17 (1954); Automobile Insurance Act, Rev. Stat. Newfoundland d. 96, § 18
(1957); Insurance Ordinance, Rev. Ord. Nw. Terr. ch. 51, § 128(1) (1956); Insurance Act,
Rev. Stat. Prince Edward Island ch. 71, § 191; Automobile Accident Insurance Act, Rev.
Stat. Sask. d. 409, § 39 (1965) ; Insurance Ordinance, Rev. Ord. Yukon Terr. ch. 57, § 128
(1958).
206. N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(2), and N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, 1958 Report [N.Y.
Legis. Doc., 1958, No. 65], p. 593.

GUEST STATUTES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
and predictability and sees the application of the law of the state that has some
connection with the event.
This solution does not reject all considerations of purpose, policy, and
governmental interest. However, it recognizes that by hypothesis if there is a
conflict in laws, there is a conflict in purpose, policy and governmental interest
and no amount of construction and interpretation can change this fact except in
a fictional sense. It also recognizes that in devising a choice of law rule policies
and interest must not be ignored, but once the rule is formulated these considerations have played their part.

